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Tangled webs
Security architectures in Asia
Asia is undergoing a deep and dynamic transformation. One effect of that transformation 
is to place new pressures on the regional security order, which must adjust to a set of 
shifting strategic relativities and relationships. Nowhere are those pressures more likely to 
be felt than in the shape of the region’s security architectures: those structures that bound 
security cooperation and competition amongst the regional players. Around the region, 
security thinkers have begun to reexamine the principal multilateral structures which exist 
and to anticipate new structures which might emerge. With Australia’s recent change of 
government, we too are re-examining a key but delicate piece of Australian strategic policy: 
how to calibrate our alliance with the United States with our engagement in the emerging 
security architectures in the Asia–Pacific.
In this paper, William Tow surveys Australia’s long-standing ‘dual strategy’ of alliance affinity 
and regional engagement. He argues that Australia should continue to pursue that strategy. 
But in the rapidly-changing Asian security environment, Australia needs to achieve a better 
policy balance between the two approaches. Part of the solution is to minimize the ‘gap’ 
inherent in the strategy, by inducing the US to adopt a more accommodating approach 
towards the region’s multilateral security structures. The impending election of a new 
American presidential administration makes such an approach timely. But we also need 
to put more work into shaping the regional structures, to enhance the prospects for great 
power cooperation, confidence-building and conflict avoidance.
The study offers specific proposals for implementing that strategy. It envisions Australia 
working with its ASEAN neighbours and other Asian states to implement a middle-power 
‘grand strategy’ designed to secure stronger levels of great power support for better 
integration of the existing architectures. Any such strategy will need to reduce ‘mission 
overlap’ between existing cooperative security institutions in the Asia–Pacific and gradually 
embrace a significant human security agenda. The Rudd government’s challenge will be to 
pursue its vision of an Asia–Pacific community in tandem with the equally difficult task of 
persuading US policy makers to accept cooperative security institutions as more conducive 
to their national interests than is now the case.
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intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government.
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ASPI had already commissioned a study on Asia–Pacific regional security 
architectures before the Prime Minister’s proposal in early June for the 
establishment of an ‘Asia–Pacific community’ by 2020. That announcement 
has only added greater interest to the findings of the original research. The 
region is already characterised by a range of institutions, agreements and 
dialogues, raising the question of how we might best ensure that both existing 
arrangements and new ones work to greatest effect in coming years.
In this paper, Professor William Tow from the Australian National University 
presents a broad overview of regional security architectures, and a guide for 
Australian policy makers on how to advance Australia’s national interests in 
coming years. His analysis turns upon a distinction between those institutions 
reinforcing cooperation and those sustaining a more competitive rivalry. 
The first tend to represent our hopes for what the region may become 
during a period of great strategic turbulence: a region where countries work 
cooperatively to build a stable, liberal regional security order. The second 
represent a set of insurance policies lest things go wrong, and the region falls 
into adversarial competition and power balancing. Australia, like other regional 
countries, hopes for the first but—with evidence of security cooperation still 
weak and fitful—must prepare for the second.
As the author notes, this represents the continuation of a long tradition in 
Australian strategic policy, a ‘dual strategy’ under which we both partner with 
the dominant Western maritime power and try to build good relationships 
with our Asian neighbours. But the paper suggests that keeping the dual 
strategy afloat is likely to prove a difficult challenge as the Asian security order 
shifts in coming decades.
Bill Tow has long been one of Australia’s preeminent international relations 
analysts, as well as one of ASPI’s long-term supporters. I am grateful to him for 
his efforts, and know readers will find value in the following analysis.
Peter Abigail
Executive Director
Executive Director’s introduction
Photo opposite: Yachts cruise underneath Sydney’s Harbour Bridge to celebrate the twenty-one world 
leaders attending the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on 8 September 2007.  
AAP/Sergio Dionisio © 2007 AAP
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Executive summary
Australia has long practised a ‘dual strategy’ approach to security, seeking 
alliance relationships with the dominant Western maritime power while 
simultaneously cultivating friendly ties with its regional neighbours. 
Australia’s new Labor government has retained this approach, seeking 
to sharpen and refine the strategy at a time when the Asia–Pacific is 
experiencing unprecedented structural change. Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd’s numerous declarations of support for the ANZUS alliance sit 
alongside his call in early June 2008 for the formation of an Asia–Pacific 
community ‘which can, for the first time, have a pan-regional dialogue on 
the question of our common security’.
But there has never been a single regional security architecture in the 
Asia–Pacific—only competing architectures. Together, they already 
represent a set of tangled webs of interconnectivity, adding vastly to 
the challenge of redesign. In the Asia–Pacific, security architectures are 
institutions or associations that shape the context and organisation of that 
region’s security order. Depending on their purposes and practices, security 
architectures can either facilitate greater stability or intensify tensions. The 
three general types of architecture are: collective defence relationships, 
security coalitions or ‘regimes’, and security communities.
Military alliances are the primary forms of collective defence organisation. 
They organise the defence resources of member states to compete 
against threats and adversaries. States form security coalitions when they 
cooperate formally or informally to neutralise security dilemmas or crises 
by applying a common set of rules or ‘norms’. Such cooperation may be 
through formal mechanisms or through ad hoc responses to a specific 
security issue. States form security communities when the coalitions they 
have formed to avoid conflict evolve into more permanent cooperative 
arrangements. Those three approaches can overlap in ways that either 
strengthen or undermine regional security politics.
Security communities and ongoing security coalitions tend to promote 
‘cooperative security’; collective defence arrangements to reflect 
‘competitive geometry’. Numerous architectures reflecting both the 
cooperative and competitive genres can be found in the Asia–Pacific. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its various 
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Executive summary
partnership arrangements, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum all attest to the vigour of regional 
community-building processes. And the US bilateral security alliance network with Japan, 
South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia, the Five Power Defence Arrangements 
involving Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), spearheaded by China and Russia, are major 
regional collective defence arrangements.
Australia faces a fundamental policy challenge in integrating its dual strategy with those 
architectures most likely to ensure stability in the region. While none of these groupings 
are entirely ‘cooperative’ or ‘competitive’ in their composition or objectives, Australia must 
nevertheless rank them according to its own national security interests. We need access to 
vital regional trading lifelines and key industrialised Asian economies. We have an interest in 
the gradual development of more liberal Asia–Pacific societies and in a stable and predictable 
regional security order—one that accommodates China and India as rising powers 
while encouraging the US to remain geopolitically engaged in the region. Our security 
requirements will continue to be best served by a judicious mix of cooperative security and 
competitive geometries.
Cooperative security organisations assessed in this strategy paper are the ARF, the 
APEC forum, and the EAS. Nearly two decades after the Cold War, cooperative security 
arrangements are important in keeping the US engaged and encouraging China to become 
a responsible stakeholder in the regional security order. Multilateral security arrangements 
in the Asia–Pacific have proven to be instruments for cooperation by great powers and 
have provided ‘hedging’ opportunities for middle and small powers to offset changing 
threats. The benefits to Australia in participating in broad and cooperative multilateral 
security arrangements are clear: middle powers can often apply meaningful leverage in such 
groupings. The alternatives to such active participation in multilateral security architectures 
could be an Asian security environment hostile to our interests or one that dilutes 
our influence.
Competitive geometries reviewed here include the San Francisco System of bilateral 
security alliances, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), the Quadrilateral Dialogue and 
NATO’s incursion into Asia. Our participation in more competitive, asymmetrical geometries 
such as the US-led bilateral network in Asia provides us with insurance in the event that 
‘multilateralism goes wrong’. It also allows us to engage with and influence the US as 
Washington shapes its own policies for reconciling its traditional postwar collective defence 
postures in the Asia–Pacific with cooperative security approaches. Australia expects that 
cooperative security institutions will become more important in the region. However, 
uncertainties surrounding the future of security dialogues in Northeast Asia, the currently 
weak security focus of ASEAN and issues associated with our domestic political identity and 
our role in the region are indicative of the complexity of the issues involved.
The paper concludes by recommending a set of ‘first steps’ that the Rudd government 
might take in pursuit of its regional community proposal. It should use and support both 
the cooperative security arrangements and competitive geometries currently functioning in 
the Asia–Pacific. Australia should streamline, where it can, the necessarily oscillating course 
between those two approaches, in part by encouraging the US to be ‘more multilateral’. 
It must plan how the Australian–American alliance will allow the Rudd government, 
and, in January 2009, a new US President to work effectively toward realising long-term 
Asia–Pacific stability.
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AustrAliA’s duAl security 
strAtegy
The changing strategic landscape
Australia faces a world experiencing unprecedented strategic change. 
The Asia–Pacific region, which is now our major trading outlet, is 
contending for global economic primacy and more geopolitical clout. 
Our most important ally, the US, remains a global superpower but 
one whose resources are clearly overstretched by intractable strategic 
commitments and whose diplomatic and cultural appeal is challenged 
by rivals. Australia’s traditional preference for allying with a ‘great and 
powerful friend’ to ensure its economic prosperity and national security 
is being tested by the growing reality that its future wealth will be 
determined by its position in Asia—and affected by the remarkable 
economic growth of China and India—even as Australian policy 
makers continue to assign strategic prominence to their country’s 
American alliance.
The Australian–American alliance remains 
strong and has arguably become even more 
important as US security postures have become 
more ‘globalised’ in the aftermath of 9/11.
Those trends raise questions about the type of structural arrangements 
that might best ensure Australia’s future prosperity and national 
security. Will the various multilateral security arrangements now 
emerging in the Asia–Pacific effectively support the regional stability 
Chapter 1
Photo opposite: President Bush and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd wave as they walk 
toward the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, 28 March 2008.  
AP via AAP/Ron Edmonds © 2008 AP
Tangled webs: Security architectures in Asia
6    ASPI Strategy  
required for this country to be secure? Or will Australia’s reliance on the US alliance remain 
the ultimate formula for the country to remain an independent and viable part of the 
international system? Can the politics of multilateralism and bilateralism be combined 
to generate a more effective approach to achieving Australian policy objectives? These 
questions confront the Australian policy community and the new Labor government.
One of Australia’s long-standing foreign policy challenges has been how we can reconcile 
our commitments to our alliances and our relationships with regional neighbours. For more 
than half a century, Australia has been a part of the American-led ‘hub-and-spokes’ bilateral 
security network in the Asia–Pacific. The Australian–American alliance remains strong and 
has arguably become even more important as US security postures have become more 
‘globalised’ in the aftermath of 9/11. The US has relied on Australia to be a major partner 
in American-led ‘coalitions of the willing’ directed against international terrorism, newly 
emergent ‘state-centric’ threats and nontraditional security challenges such as natural 
disasters, energy security, climate change and pandemics that transcend national boundaries.
… the Rudd government has declared that while Australia’s 
alliance with the US is still alive and well, it will be balanced by 
a less threat-centric outlook toward national security.
Some Asian states have responded to this trend by (incorrectly) viewing Australia under 
the conservative government of John Howard as a self-proclaimed ‘deputy sheriff’ that 
compliantly promoted US interests throughout the Asia–Pacific, and not a genuinely 
independent player in regional community-building. In the lead-up to the November 2007 
Australian federal election, Kevin Rudd served notice that, while the US alliance would 
remain a core element of Australian foreign policy, a new Labor government would exercise 
foreign policy independence from Washington when circumstances justified and would 
seek new emphases in international security policy. As Prime Minister, Rudd has conferred 
with President Bush (in March 2008) and won the President’s endorsement as an able 
manager of alliance politics. Yet Rudd quickly ratified the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, 
which the Bush Administration has opposed, and served notice to the administration that 
the 550 Australian combat troops in southern Iraq would be withdrawn during 2008. The 
President has begrudgingly acknowledged that the Australian troop withdrawal became 
politically necessary after Rudd enshrined it as an election campaign promise.
Rudd also signalled that Australia’s national security policy would be updated to encompass 
a broader spectrum of concerns related to ‘human security’ and other nontraditional 
security issues. Assigning priority to the ‘arc of instability’ of fragile South Pacific states, 
understanding and exploiting linkages between economics and security, and maintaining 
the allegiance of Australia’s own, increasingly diverse, urban socioethnic groups, the Rudd 
government has declared that while Australia’s alliance with the US is still alive and well, 
it will be balanced by a less threat-centric outlook toward national security. Accordingly, 
Australian involvement in regional community-building processes and the politics of 
multilateralism, which underwrites it, is bound to intensify.
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Background
A ‘dual strategy’ typifies Australia’s postwar management of national security policy. 
That period was beset with constant policy tensions generated by successive Australian 
governments attempting to square the American alliance with greater Australian 
involvement in various Asian regional security architectures. During the mid-to-late 1960s, 
Australian conservative governments viewed both the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) and the Asian–Pacific Council (ASPAC) as potential venues for Asia–Pacific economic 
cooperation and democratic progress. The US was initially the driver of SEATO, hoping it 
could be a part of its global network to contain international communism, and it initially 
supported ASPAC from the sidelines. It was determined that neither of those multilateral 
security groupings would supplant the bilateral hub-and-spokes alliance system that enabled 
it to dominate the strategic planning and postures of noncommunist Asia. Well aware 
of Washington’s scepticism, Australia’s own policies towards SEATO and ASPAC became 
increasingly ambiguous and its support of US preferences for the tightly-defined bilateral 
defence commitments of the San Francisco System was reinforced. When the Whitlam Labor 
government came to power in December 1972 it explored a more independent approach to 
security in the region but simultaneously reassured Washington that ANZUS remained the 
cornerstone of Australia’s defence posture.
The alliance component of Australia’s ‘dual strategy’ was tested by the ANZUS rift. This 
dispute led to New Zealand’s de facto extrication from that alliance when it dissented from 
the US’s nuclear extended deterrence posture. Nevertheless, Australian Labor Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke remained loyal to US policy and to ANZUS, even as his government moved to 
establish an independent bilateral defence relationship with New Zealand. He helped ensure 
that the US hub-and-spokes strategy toward Asia stayed intact by encouraging America’s 
other regional allies to support the US’s Asia–Pacific and global strategies.
As the Cold War drew to a close, Australian policy makers re-evaluated regional multilateral 
security. The Hawke government’s 1987 Defence White Paper and a regional security 
statement by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans both underscored Australia’s determination 
to shape a more independent security identity by embracing greater ‘defence self-reliance’  
(but still with US support and alliance ties), and endorsing the concept of ‘comprehensive 
engagement’ with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The latter statement 
was symbolic as an acknowledgement by Canberra of the need to raise Australia’s diplomatic 
and strategic profile in Asia by ‘participating actively in the gradual development of a regional 
security community based on a sense of shared security interests’ (Evans 1989: 44).
Subsequent Labor government policy initiatives during the early 1990s underscored 
Australia’s determination to pursue shared security and strategic interests with its Asian 
neighbours, applying ‘middle power diplomacy’ to develop a collective Australian and ASEAN 
sense of security and well-being. These initiatives included playing an integral role in the 
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping, participating in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), and leading efforts for a Cambodian peace settlement. In a definitive speech 
delivered to the Asia–Australia Institute in Sydney in March 1995, Evans observed that 
‘(t)hinking of ourselves occasionally, as circumstances arise, as an East Asian Hemisphere 
nation, and having others in the region able to comfortably think of us in this way, can 
do nothing to harm, and much to advance, Australia’s longer term efforts to engage and 
integrate with this part of the world …’. He warned his audience, however, that ‘no one is 
in the business of tearing up familiar bilateral alliances, least of all Australia’s with the US.’ 
Australia’s dual security strategy
Tangled webs: Security architectures in Asia
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Seeking to apply his own imprimatur on the dual strategy approach, the Foreign Minister 
concluded that despite Australia’s continued adherence to alliance politics, ‘In a region 
where the idea of power-balance retains considerable resonance, there may be much to be 
said … for working over time to unite the lesser sized countries in the region—including those 
of South-East Asia, Indochina and Australasia—into a more cohesive grouping of their own’ 
(Evans 1995).
Howard … argued that one did not need to choose between 
‘geography and history’ when calibrating Australian interests 
in Asia to relationships with the US.
Although by no means rejecting Asian engagement, the Coalition government elected 
in March 1996, led by John Howard, assigned precedence to correcting what it viewed 
as an imbalanced and ineffective approach favouring Asia over the US alliance. Howard 
accepted the logic of dual strategy but never felt compelled to choose between its two 
separate components. He argued that one did not need to choose between ‘geography and 
history’ when calibrating Australian interests in Asia to relationships with the US. As a good 
American ally, he implied that Australia was required to be forthright in supporting American 
policy interests and behaviour when such support was merited. Unqualified backing of 
US intervention in a serious China–Taiwan crisis almost immediately after assuming office, 
and the release of the ‘Sydney Statement’ at the Australia–US Ministerial Consultations 
in July 1996, reaffirmed the basic raison d’être for ANZUS. The upgrading of the Pine Gap 
joint intelligence operations in December that year was another early sign of a low-key 
but conspicuous shift in Australian policy orientation toward closer US alliance ties. The 
undeniable warmth in personal relations between Howard and US President George W Bush, 
particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington when 
Howard activated ANZUS to support the American ‘global war on terror’, later intensified 
this trend.
Yet the Howard government’s foreign policy White Paper of August 1997 insisted that 
a major function of the alliance was ‘to complement and reinforce Australia’s policy 
engagement with East Asia’ and to ensure ‘a continuing constructive US engagement 
with the region’ (DFAT 1997: 58). Throughout his time in office, Howard carefully avoided 
‘choosing’ between the alliance and the region. After an initially brief period of frosty 
relations with a China still irritated over Australia’s strong backing of US intervention in the 
Taiwan crisis, mutual economic interests prevailed in Beijing and Canberra. They laid the 
groundwork for what became a remarkable decade of growth in Sino–Australian trade and 
investment relations. With its signing of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)—to 
enable it to participate in the inaugural EAS meeting convened in December 2005—and its 
hosting of the September 2007 APEC summit in Sydney, the Howard government strongly 
signalled that it considered multilateral security cooperation increasingly important.
Sharpening and refining its dual strategy remains the core element of Australia’s national 
security. Determining how successful that strategy will be at a time when both the 
Asia–Pacific and international security environments are undergoing sweeping changes is 
the major focus of subsequent chapters.
  ASPI Strategy    9
Australia’s dual security strategy
Chapter 2 compares cooperative security and competitive geometry in the Asia–Pacific and 
how they may affect Australian interests. Three cooperative security organisations and four 
competitive geometry approaches will be briefly analysed: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); 
the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping; and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations plus China–Japan–South Korea (ASEAN+3) approach, which has evolved into a 
burgeoning ‘East Asia Summit’, are the cooperative security instrumentalities to be reviewed. 
The US bilateral alliance system in the Asia–Pacific; the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue; the 
Quadrilateral Dialogue proposal; and recent inter-regional collective defence developments 
constitute the competitive geometries to be discussed.
As noted in this paper’s introduction, ‘cooperative security’ is a process by which states come 
together to identify and pursue common values to realise a mutually acceptable regional 
order. It is most common when states view their security as best guaranteed by collaboration 
rather than competition. ‘Competitive geometries’ refers to alliances, institutions or regimes 
created or adjusted to neutralise the power and influence of perceived rival states or groups 
of states.
Regional security institutions or architectures can be competitive or cooperative depending 
on the circumstances that generate or perpetuate their existence. They can become less 
competitive over time as the threat which originally mandated their founding dissipates. 
This was the case for the US bilateral alliance system in the Asia–Pacific following the Soviet 
Union’s demise in 1991. However, nearly a decade later, the commander-in-chief of the US 
Pacific Command and his primary strategic adviser were arguing that the US alliance network 
in the region could shift from underwriting a regional balance of power to one more focused 
on strategic reassurance and a regional ‘security community’ (Blair and Hanley 2000: 7–17). 
Others argued that bilateral alliances could evolve into instruments of cooperative security, 
integrating existing or new multilateral security arrangements, without losing their capacity 
to reapply their former balancing mechanisms should new threats emerge (Tow 2001). In 
this context, competitive geometries can combine bilateralism and multilateralism or can 
function on their own to either realise greater cooperative security or to hedge against 
unfavourable structural change.
Chapter 3 deals with the way in which multilateral security politics might develop in 
ways that support Australia’s dual strategy and what cooperative security organisations 
and competitive geometry approaches might best sustain it. Australian policy planners 
confront some fundamental geopolitical decisions. Can Australia, for example, play a role 
in influencing the actions of established and rising Asian powers? What purposes should 
regional multilateral security structures serve? Should our policy makers institutionalise 
competitive geometry approaches among the region’s large powers or facilitate cooperative 
security organisations? If the current array of cooperative security organisations and 
competitive geometries is susceptible to modification, will such modifications accommodate 
or challenge our dual strategy approach to national security?
The paper’s brief final chapter (Chapter 4) will offer policy recommendations for Australia’s 
multilateral security policies. Australia’s dual strategy must be sufficiently deft to manoeuvre 
successfully between cooperative security organisations and various competitive geometry 
models over the short-term while working to achieve a stable and enduring pan-Asian 
framework. This is the challenge confronting the Rudd government.
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Chapter 2
cooperAtive security/
competitive geometries
Debate about how the Asia–Pacific security order would transform 
after the Cold War has been widespread since that struggle ended 
almost two decades ago. Although no definite successor has yet 
emerged to the strategic bipolarity that shaped the region’s postwar 
geopolitics, multilateralism has become increasingly relevant as 
a determinant of Asia’s economic and strategic landscape. Yet 
bilateralism has also continued to be surprisingly resilient. Regional 
actors are now experimenting with converting selected bilateral 
and multilateral politico-economic relationships to more overt 
security relationships. Bilateral relationships such as that between 
Australia and Japan are expanding their security components. Such 
activity is also expanding within multilateral forums such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (into the ARF) and in the 
APEC Leaders Meeting. The strategic risk inherently associated with this 
transformation process is that the variants of security interests and 
behaviours emerging from it could, if not carefully managed, polarise 
rather than reinforce Asia–Pacific order-building, with commensurate 
negative effects on international stability.
Those ongoing processes of change will challenge Australia’s 
security policies. The application of a dual strategy—alliance affinity 
and regional engagement—will become increasingly difficult 
if an antagonistic multipolarity prevails in the region and great 
powers become wary of their allies’ economic ties with potential 
strategic competitors. It will become less difficult to the extent 
that cooperative security prevails in the region through multilateral 
institutions—cooperative security organisations—that contribute to 
regional stability and order-building.
Photo opposite: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Yuudachi (DD 103) leads a 
formation of ships 5 September 2007 during Exercise Malabar 2007 in the Bay of Bengal. More 
than 20,000 naval personnel from the navies of Australia, India, Japan, the Republic of Singapore, 
and the United States took part in the exercise, designed to increase interoperability among the 
navies and to develop common procedures for maritime security operations. © 2007 AFP via AAP.
Tangled webs: Security architectures in Asia
12    ASPI Strategy  
The principal cooperative security processes in the region—ARF, APEC and the EAS—will 
be considered in the following sections. So too will recent efforts to reconstitute various 
components of the US bilateral ‘hub-and-spokes’ alliance network as effective competitive 
geometry approaches.
The application of a dual strategy—alliance affinity and 
regional engagement—will become increasingly difficult if an 
antagonistic multipolarity prevails in the region …
Cooperative security organisations
The ASEAN Regional Forum
ARF was established in July 1994. It evolved primarily from the desire of Southeast Asian 
states to soften China’s confrontational positions toward ASEAN states with whom China 
had territorial disputes (especially in the South China Sea) and to ensure that the US 
remained an engaged diplomatic and strategic player in the sub-region. A ‘concept paper’ 
tabled at the second ARF Summit in 1995 identified confidence building and preventive 
diplomacy as the best means for resolving conflict .
Australia supported this initiative, seeing it as a helpful conduit for China to be part of a 
regional cooperative security regime. At Australia’s insistence, and that of several other 
participants, intersessional meetings of officials from selected member states were 
scheduled between the annual summits. These meetings were to focus on specific regional 
security issues, specifically to avoid the accusation that ARF was simply another ASEAN 
‘talk shop’ which emulated the very slow processes of consultation and consensus-building 
associated with its host organisation. An informal process of ‘Track II’ meetings attended 
by diplomats in an unofficial capacity, as well as by academics and other independent 
experts, was created to supplement and, in some instances, to accelerate ARF deliberations. 
The first output of this process—the Council on Security and Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP)—met in Canberra in November 1994 to consider confidence-building and 
trust-building measures. That Australia would undertake such an initiative was consistent 
with the strong emphasis on regional engagement pursued at this time by Prime Minister 
Paul Keating and his foreign minister, Gareth Evans.
CSCAP’s track record has been mixed. Following its inception, it was instrumental in helping 
the ARF to define its approach to cooperative security. But over the past decade it has been 
searching, mostly in vain, for means to shape Asia–Pacific multilateral security politics. Critics 
point to what they view as a major flaw in the Track II consultative process: that ‘actual 
intra-ASEAN policy practice … remains intergovernmental and bureaucratic’, largely beyond 
the reach of independent analysts (Jones and Smith 2007: 159–160). Some academics and 
think tank leaders steering the CSCAP advisory process are perhaps too well connected to 
their respective national governments. They are more prone to support the policy status quo, 
rather than to question it or to provide advice on alternative ways to formulate and manage 
multilateral security policy. Other CSCAP chapters, including Australia’s, have recently 
talked about how to revive their purpose and agendas at a time when regional security 
developments seem to have outpaced their ability to anticipate and shape them.
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The Howard government was less comfortable than its predecessor with the symbolic 
dimensions of regional security community building and more intent on measuring the 
actual success or failure of that process. ASEAN’s consultative style, underwritten by 
so-called ‘Asian values’, illustrated what Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
regarded as cultural differences that would inevitably lead to intermittent tensions 
between Australia and various ASEAN states. This outlook was, in turn, viewed by at least 
some of the ARF’s Asian member states as an Australian vote of no confidence in regional 
cooperative security.
The Bali bombing … was a catalyst for Australia to revive 
multilateral diplomatic coordination of counter-terrorism 
strategy.
The Bali bombing (in October 2002), carried out by elements of the Islamist group Jemaah 
Islamiyah and which killed eighty-eight Australian tourists, was a catalyst for Australia to 
revive multilateral diplomatic coordination of counter-terrorism strategy. In February 2004, 
Australia and Indonesia convened the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism; 
every ARF member state was represented. Australia has also cultivated a greater ARF 
role on nuclear proliferation issues. In 2003, it exerted pressure, along with Indonesia, for 
the ARF Chairman’s Statement to criticise North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and 
pressured the North Korean foreign minister who was attending to accelerate negotiations 
with other regional powers for de-nuclearising the Korean peninsula. By maintaining 
formal diplomatic relations with North Korea (which the US and Japan do not), Australia 
has established a separate line of communications with that country that can be used to 
encourage the North to reach agreement within the Six-Party Talks nuclear disarmament 
framework. It can thus represent itself to its regional neighbours, and within ARF councils, 
as a nonproliferation advocate in its own right rather than merely acting on behalf of 
Washington’s nonproliferation agendas.
In his speech on China delivered to the Brookings Institution in April 2007, Kevin Rudd, then 
Leader of the Opposition, linked the ARF with an opportunity to strengthen Sino–Australian 
relations by involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a ‘regional counter-disaster 
coordination authority’ (Rudd 2007). Australia had already established precedents for such 
a linkage. It is a member of the ARF ‘Shepherds Group’, set up at the ARF inter-sessional 
meeting on disaster relief that was convened in September 2006 at Qingdao. Australia 
co-chaired an ARF seminar on civil–military cooperation to address pandemics in Hanoi 
during the same month and scheduled an ARF desktop exercise on civil–military responses 
to natural disasters with Indonesia in 2008. Analysts have speculated that China has been 
increasing its diplomatic influence within the ARF at the US’s and Australia’s expense. From 
initially sponsoring growing economic and investment linkages and offering limited military 
assistance, China is pursuing a visibly effective brand of regional diplomacy. It covers a 
wide spectrum of economic and security concerns that compares favourably to what many 
Southeast Asians regard as the narrow American preoccupation with Islamist terrorism in 
the region.
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This perception is strengthening notwithstanding impressive American efforts in 
coordinating disaster relief operations following the Indian Ocean tsunami, cultivation of 
wider educational linkages, and encouragement of US–ASEAN trading and investment 
ties. China’s approach could be characterised as a soft-power and region-centric strategy in 
comparison with the US emphasis on its largely globalist posture. Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s 
rejection of the US Pacific Command’s Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004 
was illustrative; Australia’s Maritime Exclusion Zone, advanced in December 2004, generated 
a similarly hostile reception within Indonesia and other ASEAN states. (The Lombok Treaty 
signed by Australia and Indonesia in November 2006 partially defused frictions over 
maritime security between those two countries and Australian policy officials have made 
progress with their ASEAN counterparts in addressing this issue.) Residual Southeast Asian 
concerns nevertheless remain that American and Australian offshore surveillance of other 
countries’ ocean traffic, and the deployment of foreign military elements proximate to 
or even within territorial waters under the guise of carrying out counter-terrorism, would 
seriously compromise the sovereign rights of ASEAN states.
A major Australian ‘stake’ in shaping the ARF is to ensure US interest in remaining involved 
within that institution, thereby reinforcing the US’s status as Australia’s primary bilateral 
alliance partner. Intermittent displays of US indifference to the ASEAN and ARF style of 
incessant conference diplomacy, with often ambiguous short-term results, complicate this 
objective. In July 2005, Condoleezza Rice’s decision—a decision she repeated two years 
later—not to attend the ARF Ministerial Meeting (AMM) meant that for the first time since 
1994 the US Secretary of State would not be present at the AMM. A continued American 
reluctance to regularly dispatch the highest US officials to key regional meetings will 
complicate Australia’s own efforts to influence regional order-building as it adheres to a 
strategy that couples Australia’s support of a continued American power role in Asia with its 
quest to be a genuinely independent regional partner.
APEC has avoided appearing to marginalise Australia or 
extra-regional powers … in ways that ASEAN or its recent 
offshoots … have not.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Since APEC’s founding in Canberra in 1989, in which Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke 
was instrumental, Australia has assigned APEC greater precedence than other regional 
cooperative security organisations. As a maritime trading power, Australia’s lifeblood is 
international trade. APEC’s policy of promoting ‘open regionalism’ and trade liberalisation 
appeals to Australia. A related consideration is that by supporting a regional order that is 
more inclusive than an East Asian trading bloc fuelled by ‘Asian values’, APEC has avoided 
appearing to marginalise Australia or extra-regional powers such as the US or Russia in ways 
that ASEAN or its recent offshoots (the ASEAN+3 and, briefly, the EAS) have not.
The US’s membership of APEC gives that organisation a viability and weight in 
Australian eyes that could not be matched by ASEAN or the EAS. By including an annual 
heads-of-government meeting (formally known as the Leaders Meeting), APEC allows 
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presidents and prime ministers of the ‘Member Economies’ to interact directly and 
bilaterally. APEC has consistently attracted heads of government to its meetings. It also 
provides a more effective structure for deliberations on wide-ranging issues than does 
the ARF, which is dependent on painstaking consensus. The APEC format and structure is 
more compatible with Australia’s dual strategy of continued US involvement in Asia–Pacific 
affairs and simultaneous engagement with regional polities as an independent and relevant 
security actor.
One of APEC’s unquestionable strengths over the past decade has been the Leaders Meeting 
as the region’s preferred consultative forum for politico-security crises. This was clearly true 
in the case of the informal deliberations between Howard and US President Bill Clinton, and 
between those leaders and the Indonesian finance minister, on the East Timor crisis that took 
place on the sidelines at APEC’s September 1999 Auckland summit (Indonesian President 
Habibie declined to attend APEC on the grounds that the East Timor crisis was becoming so 
intense that he needed to remain in Jakarta). APEC provided an informal but effective setting 
for negotiating the application of US power in support of a major Australian military effort to 
coalesce a disparate group of regional peacekeepers.
Can APEC move beyond sponsoring what many observers 
view as relatively mundane technical security agendas to play 
a greater part in building a new regional security order?
That meeting set a precedent for subsequent forays into regional and international security 
politics. At the October 2001 Leaders Meeting, a security issue—combating terrorism in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11—was for the first time formally incorporated into the APEC 
agenda. That China joined with the Bush Administration to condemn and oppose the forces 
unleashing the attacks in New York and Washington was a highly symbolic development. 
Actual counter-terrorism measures adopted by that summit were more routine: cutting off 
terrorists’ sources of finance and strengthening air and maritime security. Those measures 
included the Secure Trade in the APEC Region Initiative, focused on seaports, airports 
and other access points, coastal patrols and container security; biosecurity planning; 
anti-corruption; energy security; and various aspects of human security such as emergency 
preparedness for catastrophes.
Can APEC move beyond sponsoring what many observers view as relatively mundane 
technical security agendas to play a greater part in building a new regional security 
order? To what extent can that organisation serve Australia’s strategic objectives, which 
include avoiding regional marginalisation and keeping the US geopolitically involved 
in the Asia–Pacific? The APEC Leaders Meeting held in Sydney in early September 2007 
contributed little to answering those questions. Despite his preoccupations with Iraq and 
Afghanistan, President Bush attended the conclave largely due to his personal loyalty 
toward John Howard. Soon to face a tough federal election, Howard’s own focus was on 
climate change. The Meeting resulted only in a fairly amorphous declaration pledging the 
Member Economies to pursue non-binding ‘aspirational’ goals on energy efficiency. Most 
of the substantive deliberations occurred at informal bilateral meetings between heads 
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of government and their ministers. A casual observer could not be blamed for concluding 
that an entirely separate APEC forum was taking place, and one that would never be 
mentioned in the Leaders Meeting public communiqué. As one report summarised the event: 
‘The APEC meeting was almost as remarkable for what was not on the agenda as what 
was.’ (Johnston 2007).
Various critics of APEC have rightly observed that its mixed track record in achieving its 
stated economic objectives, its failure to deal effectively with the Asian Financial Crisis, and 
its cluttered and diffuse focus raises questions about its purpose and viability. Taiwan’s 
separate APEC membership complicates Australian efforts to raise APEC’s security profile. 
As presently constituted, APEC would appear to be of little use in mediating a potential 
Sino–American war over Taiwan because China systematically blocks Taiwan’s president 
from attending Leaders Meetings. Chinese policy may become more flexible if Taiwan’s 
new president, Ma Ying-jeou, is successful in establishing more positive interaction with the 
Chinese mainland than his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian.
Critics also point to the tendency of Member Economies to outdo each other in introducing 
new proposals for regional policy action to justify APEC’s continuing existence. While 
acknowledging that the Leaders Meetings have been at least somewhat effective as a 
diplomatic instrument, critics point to the danger that leaders may stay away if their role 
is simply to sign or ratify bland and formal policy documents (Cook and Gyngell 2005: 3; 
Gyngell 2007: 10).
The East Asia Summit
One other, more recent, cooperative security organisation that is relevant to Australia’s 
dual strategy is the East Asia Summit (EAS). EAS was spawned from the resentment of 
states most directly affected by the Asian Financial Crisis and countries such as Japan 
which resented what they saw as the inflexible, even hegemonic, behaviour of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US in dealing with defaulted loans and financial 
transparency. The EAS’s critics accuse it of reflecting the exclusivist ideal of ‘Asia for Asians’. 
Other observers, however, note that Australia has gained membership in this body and 
that to conclude that the EAS will be ‘exclusivist’ is premature because it is still shaping its 
diplomatic and economic roles. They note also that the extent to which regional security will 
actually be a core element of the EAS agenda remains unclear.
Prospects for US membership in the EAS are currently low, but if that organisation eventually 
develops into a substantive institution the US may seek to join, with the proviso that any 
promise it makes to renounce the use of force against other members would be qualified by 
allowing dispensation for its alliance commitments currently in effect throughout the region. 
Australia would, consistent with its dual strategy of engagement and alliance affinity, most 
likely pressure other EAS members to accept the US as a member under those terms. To what 
extent any such Australian lobbying would be successful is, at best, uncertain.
To understand the factors underlying these observations, a brief review of EAS history 
is appropriate. In November 1997, ASEAN leaders invited their counterparts from China, 
Japan and South Korea to an ASEAN leaders summit in Kuala Lumpur to discuss possibilities 
for closer intra-regional economic cooperation. Over the next two years, this ‘ASEAN+3’ 
configuration identified common principles for economic collaboration that were ultimately 
embodied in the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’, produced by the finance ministers of those thirteen 
states in May 2000. Those guidelines included pledges to monitor regional and international 
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flows of capital, to begin negotiating for the ‘swapping’ of East Asian currencies in future 
financial crises and to weigh the value of establishing an Asian Monetary Fund. Because 
of the size of China’s and Japan’s foreign exchange reserves and because of the levels of 
institutionalisation required to put these measures into effect, the ASEAN+3 initiative 
caught the attention of the world’s developed states as a process that could threaten future 
prospects for open regionalism.
With exclusivism more prevalent, it was a short step for the ASEAN+3 to make membership 
of the EAS more stringent. EAS affiliates would be required to sign and adhere to ASEAN’s 
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Because signatories to TAC had renounced 
the use of force, members of an EAS would have to endorse a nuclear-weapon-free Zone of 
Amity and Cooperation. They would also have to support the vision of an ASEAN Community, 
spelled out at ASEAN’s Bali Summit in 2003, based on ‘three pillars’: an ASEAN security 
community, an ASEAN economic community, and an ASEAN socio-cultural community.
Those conditions for EAS membership required countries such as Australia and India to 
re-evaluate traditional extended deterrence and nuclear force postures and—if strictly 
applied—would have excluded the US and Australia from Asian integration. However, an 
important development occurred when the ASEAN foreign ministers resolved in April 2005 
to broaden EAS membership beyond the ASEAN+3 countries. ASEAN states advocating such 
a decision, including Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam, argued that the three proposed 
non-East Asian members—Australia, India and New Zealand—would provide a useful 
counterweight to Sino–Japanese geopolitical competition. It was also seen as an effective 
way of precluding China from establishing regional hegemony and eroding ASEAN’s 
accustomed ‘pivot position’ in regional diplomacy in the process. Finally, the inclusion of US 
allies like Australia and Japan in the EAS would convey to Washington a strong message that 
ASEAN had no interest in undermining American economic or strategic interests.
Australia eventually gained entry to the EAS table, despite 
some eleventh-hour bumps along the way.
Australia eventually gained entry to the EAS table, despite some eleventh-hour bumps 
along the way. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s visit to Australia in April 2005 
illustrated how Australian–ASEAN tensions still simmered underneath the surface of polite 
bilateral diplomacy. Badawi reportedly urged Australia to sign the TAC as a precondition for 
Australian representation at the December 2005 EAS meeting. Howard rejected Badawi’s 
appeal, contending that the TAC’s adherence to a nuclear free zone in Southeast Asia 
might damage Australia’s alliance relationship, and that its stipulations that there be no 
interference in domestic affairs, would bar Australia from criticising certain Asian states’ 
(for example, Myanmar’s) human rights practices. Opposition’s Foreign Affairs spokesman 
Kevin Rudd derided Howard’s stance: ‘… blind Freddy can see that the obstacle to Australia 
signing the friendship treaty is Howard’s personal political pride, because signing the treaty 
would involve stepping back from his military pre-emption doctrine’ (Hanson 2005: 569).
Ultimately, both sides compromised. ASEAN agreed to allow Australia to participate if it 
signed the TAC and Australia agreed to sign after being assured by the ASEAN Secretariat 
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that Australia’s ANZUS obligations would not be affected. In return, Australia adjusted its 
position on the key document justifying the ‘ASEAN Way’ and ASEAN’s cardinal diplomatic 
principles. The TAC was no longer to be regarded in Canberra as an outmoded ‘Cold War 
relic’ but as an integral blueprint for community-building that would complement Australian 
bilateral security obligations. Two EAS summits have convened since the Kuala Lumpur 
founding meeting: at Cebu in January 2007 and at Singapore in November 2007. As with 
APEC, the EAS appears to have embraced a low-key politico-security agenda, focusing on 
energy security, climate change and a somewhat amorphous vision of ‘comprehensive 
economic partnership’.
Critics have argued that the irrelevance of EAS to regional community-building was 
guaranteed with China’s initial bid to restrict its membership by relegating the three 
non-ASEAN+3 participants to ‘observer status’, believing that Australia, in particular, would 
serve as a proxy for US interests in the organisation (Malik 2006: 211). When that failed, 
Beijing merely diluted the importance of the EAS by proposing to broaden membership to 
include everyone—including the US and Russia. ASEAN predictably rejected this Chinese 
proposal, sensing that its own role as the region’s community-building ‘engine’ would be 
reduced by adopting such an inclusive membership formula. It remains to be seen if those 
East Asian states still supporting a more insular approach to community-building will 
designate the ASEAN+3 as their architecture of choice because it remains the only exclusivist 
mechanism now operating in the region. Barring the unlikely event that its Northeast Asian 
members nominate the ASEAN+3 as their preferred community-building mechanism, 
Australia’s dual strategy of regional engagement and alliance affinity remains viable.
A major determinant of the bilateral security network’s 
future importance will be the extent to which US regional 
allies remain loyal to Washington’s global strategies and are 
willing to underwrite them through greater sharing of the 
defence burden.
Competitive geometry approaches
The US bilateral alliance system
Traditional international relations theory maintains that alliances between two or more 
states will endure only as long as the parties perceive a mutual threat to their security. 
Postwar US bilateral alliances in the Asia–Pacific were initially forged to protect regional 
allies against a communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. Against conventional expectations, 
these alliances currently remain operative in a region that has long moved beyond the tight 
bipolar security focus of Asian security politics during the Cold War. Formal US bilateral 
alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia, along with a 
de facto bilateral military coalition with Singapore, constitute the region’s most conspicuous, 
and arguably its most viable, regional security network. It is a competitive geometry that is 
united by its adherents’ belief that US military power is highly stabilising and by its affiliates’ 
determination to sustain its continued presence with material and normative support.
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Rationales for continuing the US hub-and-spokes alliance system have been intermittently 
re-evaluated by both US policy planners and the US’s regional bilateral allies, and have 
invariably been reconfirmed. The Nye Report, released by the US Department of Defense 
in February 1995, Japan’s 1995 National Defense Program Outline and the 1994 Australian 
Defence White Paper collectively argued that increased levels of alliance engagement 
were integral to the credibility of the hub-and-spokes network in a region confronted with 
rising military powers such as China and North Korea. More recently, the US Department 
of Defense’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report observed that these alliances 
‘make manifest the strategic solidarity of free democratic states, promote shared values 
and facilitate the sharing of military and security burdens around the world’ (US Defense 
Department 2006: 6). No other set of regional security relationships provides the same level 
of assets, political support and military coordination as that developed by those alliances over 
the past half century. The main long-term challenge to the relevance of this bilateral security 
network is the US adjusting it so that it takes a more distinctly cooperative security approach 
or the US adopting more isolationist or discriminate strategies towards Asia because it is 
preoccupied with the Persian Gulf or with the global war on terror.
Rationales for continuing the US hub-and-spokes alliance 
system have been intermittently re-evaluated by both 
US policy planners and the US’s regional bilateral allies, 
and have invariably been reconfirmed.
A major determinant of the bilateral security network’s future importance will be the extent 
to which US regional allies remain loyal to Washington’s global strategies and are willing to 
underwrite them through greater sharing of the defence burden. Recent Australian, Japanese 
and South Korean initiatives to deploy military forces as part of the US-led ‘coalitions of 
the willing’ in Iraq and Afghanistan bode well for the continuing strategic relevance of the 
San Francisco System. Also important is the uncertainty of those allies about a Chinese-led 
regional security order, which has lead to efforts to keep the US strategically engaged in Asia. 
Although China’s foreign policy now seems more amenable to multilateralism, its ultimate 
strategic intentions remain unclear and its neighbours view US power as insurance against 
rising Chinese power. Washington is thus inclined to link its allies’ lingering uncertainties 
about the region’s capacity to develop an indigenous cooperative security framework with 
greater confidence in their ability to take on more alliance responsibilities. The traditional 
‘spokes’ of the bilateral alliance network, it is hoped, will manage their future security 
relations with the US as more equal allies, less dependent on prompts by an American ‘hub’ 
on how to manage and perpetuate sound alliance politics.
The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
In this situation of changing relationships and responsibilities, Japan’s transition from a 
highly dependent ally of the US into a more ‘normal’ security actor was essential. Implicit 
also was the strengthening of the Australia–Japan security dyad, traditionally viewed as 
a ‘weak third leg’ of the Asia–Pacific’s American–Australian–Japanese maritime security 
triangle. The policy framework for achieving this had already been established in the early 
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1990s with the formalisation of annual bilateral security dialogues between Australian and 
Japanese officials. These processes gained momentum from 1995 through 2001 with the 
proclamation of an Australia–Japan ‘Partnership Agenda’ (in 1997), annual prime ministerial 
summits, stronger intelligence collaboration and increased coordination in international 
peacekeeping operations. The creation of an Australia–Japan–US Trilateral Security Dialogue 
was announced in August 2002 when Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited Canberra.
The talks were initially conducted at the vice-ministerial level but were upgraded to the 
ministerial level and renamed the ‘Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’ (TSD), to reflect their focus on 
global security issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, Iraq reconstruction, counter-terrorism 
efforts in Afghanistan and nonmilitary security issues, in addition to more traditional 
regional security problems. Under its reconstituted format, the TSD initially convened in 
Sydney in March 2006. Prior to attending that session and during a stopover in Indonesia, 
US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice had criticised China for being insufficiently 
transparent about its ongoing military buildup. She clearly softened her position when 
subsequently discussing the evident willingness of Beijing to work cooperatively with the US 
and its allies in the Six-Party Talks and on other regional and international security challenges. 
The final TSD communiqué instead ‘welcomed China’s constructive engagement in the 
region’ and underscored the value of China’s ‘enhanced cooperation with other parties such 
as ASEAN and the Republic of Korea’ (US Department of State 2006).
The TSD’s significance cannot be considered in isolation from 
a second aspect: the ‘Australia–Japan leg’ in alliance relations.
Since its Sydney debut, the TSD process has proceeded in a steady, relatively modest, but 
not totally uncontroversial, fashion. President Bush attended an informal breakfast meeting 
with Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and John Howard at the September 2007 APEC 
Leaders Meeting in Sydney, discussing how they might engage India more systematically 
on various security issues (Fujioka 2007). This prospect had been explored a few months 
previously at a ‘side-talk’ session conducted between vice-ministerial ranking officials of the 
four countries attending an ARF Senior Officials Meeting in Manila—a discussion that elicited 
a formal protest by Beijing. The latest TSD senior officials meeting assembled in Canberra in 
December 2007, again at the vice-ministerial level, to allow US officials the opportunity for 
interaction with their new counterparts in the Rudd government.
The TSD’s significance cannot be considered in isolation from a second aspect: the 
‘Australia–Japan leg’ in alliance relations. The March 2007 Australia–Japan Security 
Declaration formally signed in Tokyo by Prime Ministers Howard and Abe has been 
characterised as ‘marking a new phase in regional security whereby the “hub-and-spokes” 
mechanisms of the old [Cold War] order are being overlaid with “webs” of security 
relations across the spokes …’ (Bisley 2008: 39). Apart from formalising the growing number 
of defence cooperation linkages between the two countries, the Security Declaration 
reflected: (1) an increased level of coordination between the two countries on such global 
operations as peacekeeping and disaster relief; and (2) a desire by both Canberra and Tokyo 
to ‘hedge’ against rising Chinese power via diplomatic signalling to Beijing that they have 
the ability to mutually coordinate strategy on a regional basis and independently of the 
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US. Australian officials also wished to safeguard against Japan feeling ‘abandoned’ by both 
the US and Australia as the latter two countries explore ever-increasing economic relations 
with China. The Security Declaration provides an imprimatur for Australia and Japan to 
improve their strategic planning and material cooperation over the long-term, including the 
institutionalising of an annual ‘2+2’ dialogue of foreign and defence ministers, the shaping 
of approaches to sharing the defence burden in the wider Pacific, and policy coordination on 
nontraditional security challenges. Indeed, the prominence of nontraditional security issues 
cited in the declaration is striking.
An important question raised by both the TSD and the 
Security Declaration initiative is how they will either facilitate 
or undermine Australian and Japanese efforts to participate in 
and influence multilateral security politics in their region.
An important question raised by both the TSD and the Security Declaration initiative is how 
they will either facilitate or undermine Australian and Japanese efforts to participate in 
and influence multilateral security politics in their region. This relates to the broader issue 
of whether the logic of pursuing cooperative security while simultaneously promoting 
competitive geometries is viable in a highly fluid Asia–Pacific security environment. China 
consistently asserts that such an approach is hypocritical at best and potentially destabilising 
for regional security in a post–Cold War setting. It remains careful, however, to distinguish 
between alliances intended only to defend the territories of their signatories (which it 
acknowledges is legitimate) and those which entail defence commitments that stretch 
beyond the purview of strictly bilateral defence relations. The SCO is represented as a 
‘legitimate’ response to the territorial threats confronted by China and that organisation’s 
other signatories. Recent moves by the US and Japan to expand the purview of their Mutual 
Security Treaty’s concerns to include Taiwan is regarded as encroaching upon China’s 
sovereign interests. ASEAN states likewise tend to adopt a critical public view of alliance 
politics while quietly maintaining their own bilateral security relationships with the US and 
Australia as a hedge against Chinese power.
Japan’s failure to reconcile its war history to the extent required to pursue more concrete 
security ties with its Asian neighbours leaves it little choice. It must cultivate ongoing 
security relationships with Washington and Canberra, who remain the two major actors 
most willing to interact strategically with a more ‘normal’ Japan.
The Quadrilateral Dialogue
During 2006 and much of 2007, the Bush Administration, along with its Japanese and 
Australian allies, discussed complementing the TSD with a quadrilateral arrangement 
involving India. This investigation was justified by its proponents on several grounds. 
US–India and Japan–India bilateral security relations had already been intensifying. Japanese 
Prime Minister Abe had published a book (Toward a Beautiful Country) before coming 
to office in 2006 that envisioned a natural linkage between India and Japan, Asia’s two 
largest democracies, and was already predisposed to incorporate India into the existing 
TSD framework. All of Japan’s Self-Defence Force (SDF) chiefs had visited India in 2006–07 
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and Indian naval vessels had visited Yokosuka naval base as a prelude for India and Japan 
participating in joint exercises with US naval forces off Japan’s coast in April 2007. US Vice 
President Dick Cheney picked up on Abe’s theme of incorporating India’s military power, 
economic development and geographic location. During his visit to Sydney in March 2007, 
Cheney characterised the TSD as uniting democracies in the ‘cause of peace and freedom 
throughout the region’ and clearly implied that its expansion to a quadrilateral arrangement 
would further advance such an objective. This latest call for building what Prime Minister Abe 
labelled an ‘axis of democracy’ was quickly interpreted by Beijing to be a policy designed to 
constrain China’s interests and influence throughout Asia.
Because China’s opposition to the Quadrilateral Dialogue was swift and forceful, the Howard 
government qualified its support for the concept. China sent a formal note of concern 
to the foreign ministries of the four countries concerned in late May 2007. During the 
ensuing months it launched a strong campaign against the concept via Chinese academics 
well connected to the Chinese leadership. As one Australian commentator has since 
observed, ‘(i)t soon became nigh-on impossible to meet a Chinese foreign policy scholar 
without hearing a variant on why the quad was bad’ (Medcalf 2008:16). In his discussions 
with Cheney, Howard expressed sympathy with the idea ‘in principle’ but pleaded for 
more time to consolidate the Australia–Japan Security Declaration before moving further 
toward quadrilateralism. Risking Chinese ire to placate Cheney, Howard concluded that 
while Sino–Australian economic relations were surging to unprecedented levels, China’s 
undemocratic political system and its lack of transparency in its strategic policies made 
it impossible for Beijing to have the type of relationship with Australia that Canberra 
enjoyed with its more democratic allies. Australia’s political opposition joined with Chinese 
spokespersons to condemn this position, arguing that an ideological approach to security 
alliances was reminiscent of Cold War diplomacy and inappropriate for a region intent on 
achieving greater stability through the pursuit of cooperative security diplomacy.
Conscious of the need to avoid further geopolitical tensions 
with China, both India and Australia moved during the latter 
part of 2007 to signal to the Chinese that a democratic 
containment posture directed against it was not just around 
the corner.
The TSD powers further explored the quadrilateral concept throughout much of the rest of 
2007, sometimes with Indian participation, at various ARF sessions and at the APEC Leaders 
Meeting. A significant five-day joint naval exercise, Malabar 07, involving all four quadrilateral 
powers plus Singapore, was conducted in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. The exercise 
took place just before the ‘exploratory’ deliberations were undertaken by the leaders of the 
TSD states at the APEC meeting in Sydney. Malabar was designed to send a strong signal to 
China’s navy that had been cultivating stronger ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar to secure 
greater access to those areas of the Indian Ocean proximate to the Malacca Strait, through 
which nearly half of China’s imported oil passes on a daily basis.
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Malabar may also have been a response to the increasingly robust strategic posture of 
the SCO. That group of Central Asian states, led by Russia and China, conducted a massive 
‘counter-terrorism’ military exercise in August that looked very much like a rehearsal for 
amphibious warfare that would characterise a future conflict in the East China Sea or in the 
Malacca Strait. The SCO has also projected itself as a geopolitical counterweight to the US 
and NATO military presence in Central Asia, as an alternative outlet for India, Iran and other 
rising non-Western powers to enhance their strategic influence throughout Asia without 
becoming too close to the West, and as a means for China to secure dominant and enduring 
access to Central Asia’s substantial energy resources. That organisation remains vulnerable, 
however, to becoming a lightning rod for the expansion of Islamic and ethnic separatist 
movements in Central Asia and to precipitating Sino–Russian tensions as Beijing and Moscow 
compete for the long-term allegiance of other SCO member states.
Conscious of the need to avoid further geopolitical tensions with China, both India and 
Australia moved during the latter part of 2007 to signal to the Chinese that a democratic 
containment posture directed against it was not just around the corner. India sent two 
destroyers to exercise with the China’s North Sea Fleet off China’s coastline while Defence 
Minister Brendan Nelson and other Australian officials insisted that any Quadrilateral 
Dialogue that emerged would be limited to expanding cultural and economic ties among 
the four states. China, for its part, moved quickly to neutralise any possible momentum in 
‘quad-building’ by projecting a forceful but positive diplomatic campaign to counter balance 
the initiative. It came to APEC with specific proposals for an Australia–China Strategic 
Dialogue, thus ‘rewarding’ Australia for the engagement component of its dual strategy. 
Moreover, one of the Quad’s strongest proponents, Shinzo Abe, resigned as Japan’s prime 
minister, due to health reasons, soon after returning from APEC. His successor, Yasuo Fukuda, 
was disinclined to pursue a more vigorous strategic partnership with India and sought 
instead to initiate new diplomatic links with Beijing. Japan’s diplomatic shift coincided with 
the Singh government’s return to India’s traditional position of nonalignment. In part, this 
may be attributed to the unanticipated intensity of domestic roadblocks thrown up by both 
countries’ legislatures against ratification of the US–India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion 
Act, which may have circumvented the NPT by allowing the US to sell fuel supplies for civilian 
nuclear power to a nonsignatory state.
How effective Australia is in reconciling its Joint Security 
Declaration with Japan and its mounting economic interests 
in India with the Asia–Pacific region’s broader diplomatic 
and strategic trends will be the best measure of how well 
it has meshed this competitive geometry with its overall 
dual strategy.
Further, John Howard was defeated by Kevin Rudd in the November 2007 Australian 
federal election. Within two months, the new government had announced it would not be 
participating in quadrilateral security relations involving India but would be continuing TSD 
activities. Critics of this decision would label it the ‘Finlandisation’ of Australian foreign policy 
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by Chinese pressure; proponents would view it as a belated but welcome development that 
eliminates a needless provocation of the PRC. One possible ramification was to heighten 
Japanese concerns that the Rudd government may have been too quick to relinquish the 
quadrilateral option at Japan’s expense and too dismissive of growing Indian concerns that 
Australian policy is becoming overly ‘Sino-centric’ (Sheridan 2008). How effective Australia is 
in reconciling its Joint Security Declaration with Japan and its mounting economic interests 
in India with the Asia–Pacific region’s broader diplomatic and strategic trends will be the best 
measure of how well it has meshed this competitive geometry with its overall dual strategy.
Australia’s international security policy must be shaped by 
those concerns which have the greatest impact upon its 
national security. Among the most important determinants 
is its major US ally’s relative international power base which, 
in turn, affects its capacity to exercise strategic primacy in an 
increasingly uncertain Asia–Pacific region.
Inter-regional competitive geometries
Australia’s international security policy must be shaped by those concerns which have the 
greatest impact upon its national security. Among the most important determinants is its 
major US ally’s relative international power base which, in turn, affects its capacity to exercise 
strategic primacy in an increasingly uncertain Asia–Pacific region. Other key factors are WMD 
proliferation, terrorism and an array of ‘human security’ issues that transcend sovereign 
boundaries; for example, natural disasters, pandemics, energy and the environment. The 
lines between multilateralism and multipolarity are often indistinct at the inter-regional 
level of security policy management. This has led to divisions within Australia’s policy-making 
community over the degree to which its strategic missions and force capabilities should be 
tailored to support US-led ‘global’ coalitions and alliance operations or structured to respond 
primarily to regional contingencies.
This debate is illustrated by concerns over Australia’s participation in the American-led 
multinational force in Iraq and by its ongoing involvement with NATO operations in 
Afghanistan. The Rudd government has served Washington notice that it will withdraw 
Australia’s Overwatch Battle Group from what has been a largely inharmonious coalition 
of intervening powers since the Iraq War commenced in March 2003 but will retain 
other forces in a logistical or training capacity. It has endeavoured to soften this decision, 
however, by reassuring Washington that it will sustain consistent and substantial levels 
of force strength alongside US and NATO forces in the fight against Taliban and al-Qaeda 
insurgents in Afghanistan. It does so as the largest non-NATO contributor of manpower 
(over 1,000 military personnel) to the International Security Force in Afghanistan.
In February 2008, Joel Fitzgibbon became the first Australian defence minister to attend a 
NATO ministerial meeting. Successfully calling for a more systematic exchange of intelligence 
and combat plans between NATO and Australia, Fitzgibbon warned that his country’s future 
involvement in the Afghan conflict would become unsustainable without such access. 
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Australia had already signed a wide-ranging counter-terrorism agreement in April 2005, 
and another agreement on security of information, in September 2007, that were allegedly 
designed to form the basis for such exchange. Australian participation in ‘out-of-area’ 
alliance operations could well become more selective as the Rudd government concentrates 
on responding to the Pacific Island ‘arc of instability’ and as it assigns greater priority to 
sharpening its credentials as an Asian multilateralist.
Recent proposals by US presidential candidates for Australia to join a formal expanded 
version of NATO are unlikely to become policy reality unless the concerns articulated 
by Fitzgibbon are addressed effectively by US and European defence officials. More 
fundamentally, any move to establish NATO as the dominant military structure in Eurasia 
would be resisted by the SCO and most likely by Asians in general. It would not be in 
Australia’s best interests to agree to such an initiative until it was clear that such an 
inter-regional competitive geometry would add value to regional stability and order.
It seems likely that Washington must accept the assumption 
that Australia will, for the time being, assume a greater shared 
defence burden only in its own neighbourhood.
It seems likely that Washington must accept the assumption that Australia will, for the 
time being, assume a greater shared defence burden only in its own neighbourhood. As 
an example, Australia’s recent interventions in the Solomon Islands and East Timor are 
regarded in US planning circles as a critical part of its overall contribution to international 
security, preventing the spread of failed states in the fragile South Pacific sub-region. Future 
peacekeeping scenarios involving the Australian Defence Force may well be limited to 
regional operations but these can still be regarded as complementing US global strategy.
Conclusion
The Asia–Pacific has now reached an important turning point in shaping its future 
approaches to and structures for achieving greater regional security. Cooperative security 
tends to be open and broad while competitive geometries are more typically closed and 
‘exclusive’. Asia has already developed several variants of cooperative security (the ARF, APEC 
and, to a more qualified extent, the EAS) and they are useful for reassuring states such as 
Australia, India and the US about their nonmarginalisation in regional security politics. Their 
effectiveness is limited, however, by continued questions about their purpose and identity 
relative to the core policy objectives of their member states, by continued uncertainties 
about China’s and the US’s overall support for multilateral security politics, and by their still 
largely cumbersome decision-making mechanisms which inhibit their ability to manage the 
most difficult security challenges facing the region. Competitive geometries thus appear 
by default to be presently more effective security mechanisms. However, those cooperative 
elements now becoming more visible in alliance politics, such as disaster relief, military 
transparency and confidence building, are still not shifting rapidly enough the exclusivist 
orientation of those geometries to enable them to contribute decisively to longer-term 
Asia–Pacific stability and community-building.
Tangled webs: Security architectures in Asia
26    ASPI Strategy  
It may be that realising those objectives can best be progressed by exploring how coalitions 
and regimes underlying such security geometries, such as the ad hoc Six-Party Talks 
(SPT) on North Korean denuclearisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and/or 
the San Francisco System, can be applied to pursuing broader, non-exclusive agendas of 
confidence building and cooperation. Great power support for such exploration, however, is 
an obvious precondition. Further discussion of specific approaches Australia could adopt to 
facilitate such support will be offered in Chapter 4.
As an involved and consistent player in regional security 
dialogues and negotiations, Australia has helped balance 
intensifying Chinese involvement in the Asia–Pacific’s 
multilateral security politics while facilitating China’s 
enmeshment into the regional community-building process.
To engage Asia on multilateral security issues, Australia has had to balance regional 
conciliation with alliance affiliation—participation in cooperative security organisations 
with effective competitive geometry approaches. It has established policy niches within 
the larger community-building process in both the traditional and nontraditional security 
sectors. These include promoting the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
strengthening regional approaches to counter-terrorism, and upholding various dimensions 
of human rights and human security. As an involved and consistent player in regional security 
dialogues and negotiations, Australia has helped balance intensifying Chinese involvement in 
the Asia–Pacific’s multilateral security politics while facilitating China’s enmeshment into the 
regional community-building process.
These achievements have not been realised without cost. As a Western power geographically 
situated on the margins of Asia, Australia has at times struggled to establish its image 
and role as a participant in regional affairs. The Howard government’s first years in office 
were particularly difficult as it was viewed by many Asians as a regional proxy of the US, 
overly prone to either employ military power on its own or to support the American use 
of force during regional crises. It faced a painful identity crisis when compelled to choose 
between supporting TAC or being barred from joining the EAS. It was also economically 
pressured at various intervals by China to disassociate its alliance politics from its regional 
multilateral postures.
Australia has also had occasional difficulties in fitting the rationales and development of 
competitive geometries into its dual strategy of engagement and alliance affinity. Such 
integration has been made even more challenging by China’s entry into multilateral security 
politics in significant ways. China has incorporated subtlety and firmness in the diplomacy it 
has used to blunt Australian efforts to perpetuate alliances while ensuring their adaptability. 
Other policy tests have also emerged. The changing domestic politics of Australia, Japan 
and the US, and of would-be security partners such as India, have effectively jettisoned the 
quadrilateral initiative. And the Rudd government, like its predecessor, will need to identify 
how the TSD and the upgraded Australia–Japan security dyad can strike a judicious balance 
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between functioning as order-building initiatives while retaining effective capabilities for 
responding to future regional threats.
Multilateral institution-building for cooperative security in response to specific and pressing 
international issues such as nuclear proliferation and natural disasters has also been, arguably, 
somewhat easier to manage. Those multilateral institutions, however, are not usually 
threat-centric in a traditional sense. They are justified and supported on the basis that if 
issues are not resolved they could destabilise regional security. Critics of those regimes, and of 
multilateral security institutions in general, are adamant that the idea of ‘community’ cannot 
be more than a misguided illusion in what is still a realpolitik world. Their numbers and 
logic will ensure that competitive geometries continue and that they will require innovative 
approaches to mesh them with cooperative security approaches in the Asia–Pacific and 
internationally for some time to come. The test for Australian policy makers is how to calibrate 
these two approaches until more enduring regional and global orders may finally emerge. The 
purpose, capabilities and relative success of multilateral instrumentalities need to be taken 
account of in this context. Those factors will be addressed in following chapters.

  ASPI Strategy    29
Photo opposite: Asian leaders arrive for signing of Framework Agreement on ASEAN–South Korea 
Economic Cooperation at ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2005. © Beawiharta/
Reuters/Picture Media
Chapter 3
envisioning And implementing 
multilAterAlism
With multilateral security politics becoming ingrained as a permanent 
feature in the Asia–Pacific security environment, Australian policy 
planners need to ask what Australia wants regional multilateral 
‘architectures’ to do in coming years, how much they can reasonably 
be expected to do, and which cooperative security arrangements 
might best satisfy its security needs and objectives. These questions 
must be answered with an analysis of how effective Australia’s dual 
strategy of engagement and alliance affinity can be as multilateralism 
assumes greater importance in the region and whether the models of 
cooperative security and competitive geometries can be integrated to 
the extent that the dual strategy remains viable.
… significant modification or consolidation of 
existing cooperative security organisations in 
the Asia–Pacific will be difficult to implement 
over the short term.
The basic premise of this chapter is that significant modification or 
consolidation of existing cooperative security organisations in the 
Asia–Pacific will be difficult to implement over the short term. They 
have too much history of support by specific factions, and too much 
prestige hanging on their immediate survival, for them to dissolve as 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Asia–Pacific 
Council (ASPAC) dissolved during the Cold War. However, the region, 
instead of being ‘ripe for rivalry’ as realist observers initially suspected 
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has evolved to being perhaps ‘prone to partnership’ in resolving important security issues. 
Both China and the US, the two key players required to collaborate if cooperative security 
is to be successful, have recently signalled their willingness to participate more fully in 
such mechanisms. Chinese political officials and analysts have propagated a more active 
multilateralism as part of their current approach to Asia–Pacific security politics. And in 
an address to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs in late February 2008, US Secretary 
of Defense Robert M Gates observed that US security policy in the Asia–Pacific region 
was shifting toward developing ‘more multilateral ties than [preserving] hub-and-spokes’ 
(Gates 2008). If such rhetoric presages actual policy, Australia’s dual strategy of regional 
engagement and alliance affinity would appear to be appropriate for the predictable future.
Sceptics of multilateral security architectures remain deeply concerned that cooperative 
security organisations are, at best, costly diversions to shaping sensible national and 
international security policy and, at worst, precipitates of intensified geopolitical 
competition. This argument was recently encapsulated by David Martin Jones and 
Michael LR Smith in their vigorous critique of ASEAN and its supporters:
… those in the association among its academic enthusiasts who seek to embellish it as a 
framework for a more integrated ASEAN identity grounded in its distinctive norms and 
processes and framed by its inimical discourse only succeed in creating not a community 
but an illusion. Moreover, the attempt to project this illusion into a wider East Asian 
Community only exacerbates the confusion enveloping the behaviour of ASEAN’s more 
powerful neighbors in Northeast Asia toward the grouping (Smith and Jones 2007: 149).
For many of those critics, the best strategic policy for ensuring Asia–Pacific stability and 
prosperity is to strengthen existing competitive geometries such as the US bilateral alliance 
system in Asia, or to build new ‘coalitions of the willing’ for confronting what they view as a 
regional environment rife with strategic uncertainty for Western and pro-Western interests. 
Proponents of building competitive geometries are unmitigated enthusiasts for the alliance 
side of the dual strategy equation. Their position is summarised by the conviction that 
‘so long as interests of their members remain congruent, alliances need not wither in the 
absence of a respectable enemy, but can be reconfigured to meet changing circumstances 
and infused with new meanings and goals’. This chapter will look at both these concerns and 
the views of cooperative security groups.
The intent of Asia–Pacific multilateralism/cooperative security
At least two major incentives underscore Australia’s desire to cultivate multilateralism in its 
security policy. Like ASEAN, Australia wants to leverage cooperative security organisational 
participation as a hedge against great power opportunism or expansionism in the region. It 
also wants to enmesh American power into regional security dialogues and initiatives. The 
weight of US trade volume with Asia, the dynamic growth of Asian regional economies and 
the growing concentration of military power in that region mandate that global security 
politics reflect the inevitability of the Asia–Pacific as a critical sphere of interest.
The great powers and cooperative security
Three major trends will impact the potential effectiveness of cooperative security in the 
Asia–Pacific. First, there are significant shifts in the region’s balance of power because 
of the economic rise of China and India, because of asymmetrical threats such as WMD 
proliferation, terrorism and arms buildups, and because of the intensification of various 
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cultural, religious and ethnic agendas. Such shifts increasingly determine Australia’s strategic 
position. China’s growing role as a predominant Australian economic partner has clearly 
given Beijing increasingly significant leverage over Australia notwithstanding continued 
apprehensions about Beijing’s ultimate strategic motives. The ASEAN states, along with 
Australia, Japan and South Korea as the US’s closest regional allies, have apprehensions 
about a possible Sino–American military confrontation over Taiwan or a sudden Chinese 
transformation from a relatively benign regional security actor into a more aggressive one. 
India’s nonalignment diplomacy, moreover, provides no long-term guarantee that New Delhi 
won’t find itself at odds with China over China’s penetration into the Indian Ocean or the 
accelerated development of its strategic forces. Security dilemmas involving great powers 
are still fully capable of emerging and intensifying in this region.
… there are significant shifts in the region’s balance of power 
because of the economic rise of China and India, because of 
asymmetrical threats such as WMD proliferation, terrorism 
and arms buildups, and because of the intensification of 
various cultural, religious and ethnic agendas.
A second trend, which will have an impact on the potential effectiveness of cooperative 
security organisations in the region, is inter-regional geopolitics. As noted in Chapter 2, 
NATO operations in Afghanistan and maritime security exercises in the Indian Ocean involve 
increasingly conspicuous ‘Asia–Pacific’ components. Although represented by the US and its 
regional friends and allies as innocent and logical responses to international security threats 
of universal concern, China, Russia and their affiliates in the SCO may view them as nothing 
less than geopolitical pre-emption at their expense. Applying competitive geometries across 
the global chessboard carries risks if they are not carefully considered and implemented with 
sensitivity and finesse.
A third trend linked to the great powers relates to the growth of ‘minilateralism’ as a hybrid 
of the cooperative security and competitive geometry multilateral security typologies. 
Minilateralism may involve, as an example, a small number of states working together to 
address security issues of most direct concern to themselves. The agendas of such groupings 
are usually less extensive than those pursued by their fully fledged cooperative security 
counterparts, and they are less likely to expand into inclusive multilateral institutions. Such 
groupings tend to encase their agendas in order-building rather than threat-centric trappings.
The TSD could be regarded as a ‘minilateral’ body, as Australia, Japan and the US are already 
bound together by precedents of bilateral alliance cooperation or by distinct politico-cultural 
values that distinguish them from other regional actors. But the TSD’s agenda is shaped 
more by the issues it has in common with other regional actors on a range of mostly 
nontraditional security issues; for example, counter-terrorism, human security and human 
rights in addition to more traditional concerns related to nuclear nonproliferation and the 
stability of the Korean peninsula. According to their communiqués, TSD partners see China as 
a source of constructive engagement in those policy contexts rather than as a threat to their 
mutual security.
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The Quadrilateral Dialogue concept also integrated norms and interests in ways consistent 
with minilateralism, promoting democratic values when addressing the maritime security 
preoccupations of maritime powers and promoting regional development when providing 
disaster relief and other human security initiatives. Other minilateral variants in the 
Asia–Pacific, however, have formed solely on the basis of current concerns rather than 
history and values. The SPT, for example, features China collaborating with the US and other 
Asia–Pacific democracies to preclude North Korean nuclear capabilities from undermining 
regional stability. Any grouping emerging from the SPT and leading to the creation of a 
Northeast Asian Security Dialogue would likewise be at least initially predicated on rationales 
of conflict prevention rather than on broader regional community-building.
Keeping the Americans around
Recent statements by Gates and other US policy planners indicate that the US is ready to 
consider projecting a more multilateralist security posture in the Asia–Pacific and to adapt its 
postwar bilateral alliance system to emerging and diverse security challenges in the region.
This changing American orientation fits more readily into the Rudd government’s publicly 
designated, multilaterally oriented, ‘three pillars’ of foreign policy—the alliance, Asian 
engagement and the United Nations—than would the still existing US preference for 
hub-and-spokes alliance politics. A new US President taking office in January 2009 could 
either reinforce an American willingness to support cooperative security in Asia or, 
alternatively, apply the politics of competitive geometries to forge new, ideologically or 
geopolitically based power blocs there.
… cooperative security should facilitate the realisation of US 
aspirations for China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in 
Asia–Pacific order-building …
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama has, for example, argued for a more 
effective security framework in Asia that goes beyond bilateral agreements, occasional 
summits, and ad hoc arrangements and for the establishment of a Northeast Asia security 
regime. His Republican counterpart, John McCain, has publicly argued that the Quadrilateral 
Dialogue should be part of a larger ‘League of Democracies’. But neither of those proposals 
appear sufficiently nuanced to meet the criterion for maintaining the type of power 
equilibrium between China and the US that would most appeal to a Rudd-led Australia. 
As Hugh White has recently observed: ‘Give Beijing too much and you risk encouraging 
a Chinese bid for hegemony in Asia. Give it too little and you risk undermining the old 
deal and being drawn into a new and bitter strategic competition with China. So far, US 
political leaders, distracted by the war on terror, have mostly responded to this challenge by 
pretending it isn’t there …’ (White 2008).
Ideally, cooperative security should facilitate the realisation of US aspirations for China 
to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in Asia–Pacific order-building, while still leaving 
Washington room to move if Beijing vies for primacy with the US or other regional powers. 
It should also facilitate effective multilateralism among other Asian powers by balancing 
American power projection, Chinese opportunism, revived Japanese nationalism, and Indian 
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nonalignment. Cooperative security must find a common strategic purpose. It can do so by 
seeking and identifying complementarity and rationalisation between existing cooperative 
security organisations without necessarily leading to the disbanding of any one of them. The 
region has not faced such a complex set of geopolitical requirements since Richard Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger exploited the Sino–Soviet rift nearly four decades ago to end the Vietnam 
War and remove Cold War politics permanently from Asia. Australia requires a similar level of 
American leadership to establish multilateralism as a credible policy instrument for achieving 
regional stability.
Asian cooperative security: what can be reasonably expected?
As the US hub-and-spokes strategy evolves from a more traditional hierarchical, bilateral, 
form of alliance politics to one apparently more attuned to multilateral security, regional 
hedging by large and smaller powers intent on maintaining equilibrium in the region is 
emerging. This has involved both cooperative security instrumentalities and competitive 
geometries and has resulted in substantial levels of policy coordination in response to 
emerging and diverse forces of religious extremism, ethnic strife, natural disasters and other 
transnational threats in the region.
… ideological differences often prompt great powers and 
other states to hedge against each other even within 
multilateral consortiums.
With this background, a controversial proposition emanates: that multilateral security 
architectures can be shaped or reconstituted as much in response to threat-centric and 
power balancing rationales as by the pursuit of cooperative security politics. To adherents of 
traditional theories of multilateralism this observation is misplaced. They assume that the 
development of community-building institutions is inherently underwritten by common 
rules or ‘norms’ that will generate sufficient common ground among diverse member states 
to modify their competing interests. Multilateralists also maintain that the rules-based order 
that they support minimises prospects for institutional defection or cheating by one or more 
members. However, great powers may engage in multilateralism because they have an 
interest in shaping a regional or global order that may not suit their every interest but which 
they can accept as preferable over other likely, alternative orders.
For multilateralists, the potential costs of hegemonic behaviour seem very high: they include 
often self-destructive physical and financial risks, the need for constant military intervention 
and possibility of ‘imperial overstretch’. Over time, they assert, a hegemon incurs great risks 
because its ability to win compliance from weaker states will invariably decrease as more 
powerful counter-coalitions form. If this logic is valid, multilateralism should usually prevail 
over multipolarity or hegemonic competition.
In reality, however, ideological differences often prompt great powers and other states to 
hedge against each other even within multilateral consortiums. China’s recent diplomacy 
directed toward the EAS and the ARF, discussed in Chapter 2, is illustrative. It’s viewed by 
sceptics of multilateralism as evidence that power balancing tactics will be used alongside 
genuine multilateralism in most institutional settings.
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Australia has pursued its own post–Cold War hedging strategy by pursuing affiliation 
with both cooperative security organisations and competitive geometries. Its preferred 
outcome for ongoing regional security politics includes the refinement of existing regional 
multilateral groupings capable of commanding adherence from the region’s larger powers 
and their smaller counterparts. This scenario would enable ‘middle powers’ such as Australia 
and various ASEAN states to exert regional influence. Some promising developments 
have emerged in this regard: the ASEAN Charter initiative, the prospect for scaling back 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea. They are all illustrative of modest confidence-building triumphs that 
have been at least partially based on cooperative security foundations. But none of these 
developments have resolved the underlying conflicts that continue to plague their intended 
beneficiaries: ASEAN has still not activated its High Council to resolve a Southeast Asian 
dispute; the North Koreans still work to divide and eventually rule the Korean peninsula; and 
China still contests the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands with four ASEAN claimants.
Multilateral cooperation is not yet so viable as to induce Australia or other US regional friends 
and allies to eschew completely the benefits of alliance affinity with Washington—indeed, 
it may never be. But it is sufficiently compelling to appeal to those states. This leads 
to the obvious question of what type of effective Asia–Pacific architectures might be 
generated from combining elements of both cooperative security organisations and 
competitive geometries.
It is unlikely that any single, overarching multilateral security 
architecture will emerge anytime soon to supersede existing 
bilateral and multilateral instrumentalities in the Asia–Pacific.
Possible regional security structures and competitive geometries
It is unlikely that any single, overarching multilateral security architecture will emerge 
anytime soon to supersede existing bilateral and multilateral instrumentalities in the 
Asia–Pacific. Insufficient consensus exists. ASEAN states regard the ARF as the best means 
to retain a ‘pivot position’ in orchestrating the security dialogues and agendas that most 
matter in Asian security politics. The US, Japan and Australia remain partial to APEC as 
the best embodiment of open regionalism, allowing for maritime states located along 
the peripheries of Asia to nevertheless play a key role in shaping regional economics and 
geopolitics. If a more viable model of an inclusive EAS did not exist, China would be most 
likely to fine-tune its ARF diplomacy, which is intended to attract ASEAN states increasingly 
tied to China’s economic growth. It is adopting this approach while simultaneously pursuing 
a wedging strategy against an evolving US hub-and-spokes bilateral alliance network. 
Australia and Japan are being pulled ever more tightly into the Chinese economic orbit. 
This blunts US power as a major factor in defining and shaping regional order-building. It 
does not completely isolate Washington from the process, however, as Chinese power and 
growth leads other regional actors to view an American regional presence as an essential 
counterweight to Beijing’s strategic aspirations and conduct.
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Until the dynamics of Sino–American relations—the most important factor of Asia–Pacific 
security in the early twenty-first century—are sorted out, the Korean peninsula becomes 
unified in a stable way and the politico-strategic roles of the ‘marginally positioned’ powers 
such as India, Japan and Russia are more precisely defined, it is improbable that existing 
bilateral and multilateral architectures will be supplanted. Debate has arisen over which 
security model might best serve regional stability and prosperity if both the bilateral and 
multilateral architectures remain.
A hegemonic or hierarchical system resembling the American hub-and-spokes framework 
during the Cold War or a possible ‘China-dominant’ system would appear flawed as regional 
architectures because there is no assurance that other state-centric actors would support 
such arrangements, as opposed to seeking ways to neutralise them. A bipolar variant of 
hegemony (what has been termed a ‘condominium of power’ or ‘geography of peace’) 
featuring Chinese–American ‘co-management’ of the region might work more readily but 
would be constantly subject to tension if the Taiwan dispute and major Sino–American 
ideological differences were not resolved.
An alliance of great powers other than the US could provide 
China, in particular, but also India and Russia, status to 
influence Asia–Pacific security trends.
An alliance of great powers other than the US could provide China, in particular, but also India 
and Russia, status to influence Asia–Pacific security trends. But two preconditions would 
need to be present for this type of architecture to work:
• at least a rough symmetry in military and economic power between the participants
• a sufficiently compatible set of interests and values shared by participants to facilitate 
strategic cooperation and minimise prospects for strategic competition.
At present, the continued preponderance of US military power combines with the 
significantly divergent strategic interests and political values of Russia, India and China to 
preclude a strategic modus vivendi. Minilateral variants of the alliance could be employed to 
resolve specific issues (the SPT is a case in point) but the emergence of a more permanent 
small structure to manage the region’s overall security order would be problematic.
Discussion has also focused on what many view as a pressing need for Northeast Asia 
to create a cooperative security architecture, similar to that of ASEAN’s, for dialogue, 
negotiation and conflict resolution. During a visit to Japan in November 2007, US Assistant 
Secretary of State Christopher Hill observed that once the denuclearisation of the Korean 
peninsula was achieved, the SPT should be used as a catalyst to build a Northeast Asia peace 
and security forum. While observing that such a grouping should ‘… (i)n no way [be] designed 
to replace the very key bilateral relationships, the bilateral alliances that the US has and is 
very proud to have with a number of countries in Asia’, it could represent ‘a long-term project 
building a sense of neighbourhood in Northeast Asia’ (Hill 2007).
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Northeast Asia’s spectacular growth in intraregional trade 
and investment has combined with a recognition that its 
long-standing security dilemmas in Korea and Taiwan and 
the potential standoff between China and Japan must 
be resolved …
Northeast Asia’s spectacular growth in intraregional trade and investment has combined 
with a recognition that its long-standing security dilemmas in Korea and Taiwan and the 
potential standoff between China and Japan must be resolved if Chinese economic growth, 
continued Japanese prosperity and Asia’s overall geopolitical leverage are to be sustained and 
strengthened. A cooperative regional identity in Northeast Asia is an obvious precondition 
for a peaceful Asia–Pacific community. Unfortunately, China still harbours irredentist 
grievances; Japan is exploring ‘normalcy’ more than sixty years after its wartime defeat; 
Russia is attempting to avoid marginalisation from Northeast Asian marketplaces and 
geopolitics; and the US intermittently shifts between strategies that appear threatening and 
contemplation of strategic retrenchment to offshore positions. Over the past decade, ASEAN, 
along with Australia, has been largely reactive rather than innovative in providing assistance 
to resolve Northeast Asian security dilemmas.
It’s a daunting task interpreting the confusing mosaic of alternative cooperative security 
organisations and competitive geometries which constitute the Asia–Pacific security 
environment. Implementing a proactive policy within that environment is even more 
challenging for the Rudd government. Australia’s future security is dependent upon whatever 
forms of Asia–Pacific order-building eventually prevail. In filling its long-standing and 
self-acclaimed role as an entrepreneurial middle power, Australia requires its policy planners 
to plan objectively and systematically. In this context, Chapter 4 offers some observations 
and policy recommendations.
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Essential
Advantage
At Booz & Company we work closely with 
our clients to create and deliver essential 
advantage in any situation. We bring unique 
foresight and knowledge, deep functional 
expertise, and a practical approach to building 
capabilities and delivering real impact.
This philosophy has been at the heart of 
our company since its formation in 1914. It’s 
lived every day by more than 3,300 Booz & 
Company people across 57 of ces in over 30 
countries. And it’s more relevant today than 
ever before.
From May 2008 we separated our operations 
from the U.S. government consulting business, 
which will continue as Booz Allen Hamilton.
We understand the special relationship 
between the Australian and U.S. defence 
and security communities and will continue to 
collaborate closely in areas of mutual interest.
For our Australian defence and security clients, 
this means we will continue to access the 
global Booz community to ensure we deliver 
world class expertise, global best practices and 
deep insight to our client’s problems.
Booz & Company - a new name for the 
founders of the management consulting 
profession.
Visit www.booz.com.au to learn more.
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Photo opposite: The representatives from the countries involved in six-party talks on North 
Korea’s nuclear program hold hands as the meeting officially begins in Beijing 26 July 2005. 
(L–R) US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, North 
Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Li Zhao Xing, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alexeyev, South Korea’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and Director-General of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Kenichiro Sasae. © Elizabeth Dalziel/Reuters/Picture Media
Chapter 4
AustrAliA, multilAterAl 
security And future 
policy directions
Australia’s new Labor government has reaffirmed its strong support 
for the US alliance as a fundamental component of Australian foreign 
policy. However, as Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, reiterated 
in a February 2008 press interview, the government intends ‘to 
take much more of a multilateral approach’ than its predecessor 
and ‘put the shoulder much more effectively to the wheel in the 
Asia–Pacific region’ (Smith 2008). The dual strategy is thus alive 
and well as the primary Australian approach to foreign policy and 
national security in an increasingly complex regional and international 
security environment. Over the past decade, Australian foreign and 
security policies have been dominated by Australian support for and 
participation in American-led military interventions and by the politics 
of regional trade. The next few years may be increasingly shaped by 
constrained domestic and international economic growth and a need 
for attention to near neighbours situated within the ‘arc of instability’, 
and sustained diplomacy to resolve conflict within the Asia–Pacific 
and globally. The challenges of terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation and 
human security will still remain.
Multilateralism will be complicated, however, by a requirement for the 
region’s great powers to avoid the most damaging ramifications of 
regional multipolarity. As the US becomes more discriminating about 
the type of influences and resources it will apply to the region and as 
both China and India continue ‘growing strong’, Australia, along with 
ASEAN and South Korea, will need to formulate and apply a collective 
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middle power ‘grand strategy’ to promote community-building in an increasingly uncertain 
regional security environment.
The Rudd government has already signalled its determination to undertake a number of 
measures to strengthen Australia’s multilateral credentials and to project entrepreneurial 
leadership in such key policy areas as climate change, the development politics of Pacific 
Island states and disarmament and arms control. In a speech to the Asia Society in early June, 
the Prime Minister proposed the creation of a new Asia–Pacific ‘community’ that would 
include all the region’s major powers and would facilitate sustained dialogue on economic, 
political and security issues. Insisting that Australia must be ‘thinking big’ about how to form 
and manage regional institutions and architectures, Rudd announced the appointment of a 
high-level envoy, former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard 
Woolcott, to consult with regional policy elites on how to move forward with this vision.
The Rudd government has already signalled its determination 
to undertake a number of measures to strengthen Australia’s 
multilateral credentials and to project entrepreneurial 
leadership …
Rudd argued that the European Union, although ‘not…an identikit model of what we would 
seek to develop in the Asia–Pacific’, nevertheless contained a valuable set of lessons for 
regional architects. The principal lesson, he argued, was the necessity of taking the first step. 
The proposal touched off a lively media debate. Critics argued that the European Union’s 
postwar experience (referred to by the Prime Minister when introducing his proposal) 
could not be a model for an Asia far more culturally and politically diverse than were those 
European states spearheading their continent’s integration fifty years ago. And a former 
prime minister, Paul Keating, argued that the new proposal risked diluting the influence of 
the APEC leaders’ meeting, something he saw as ‘a jewel in Australian foreign policy.’ 
It is true that growing new institutions in the Asia–Pacific will be difficult. But what might 
‘first steps’ towards closer regional integration look like in this region? In particular, what 
might they look like given Australia’s wish to sustain its dual strategy approach to balancing 
regional engagement with its alliance commitments?
Four broad strategies will be advanced here as preliminary steps for Australia to effectively 
apply cooperative security politics while achieving such calibration. They are:
(1) using and supporting existing regional cooperative security organisations and 
competitive geometries
(2) working with other Asian actors to streamline and consolidate regional 
community-building processes by eliminating ‘mission overlap’ between different 
architectures
(3) negotiating with its US ally a formula for further movement beyond the hub-and-spokes 
model of regional security management
(4) making a concerted effort to join Canada, Japan, the Scandinavian states and selected 
non-governmental organisations to draw up long-term, cohesive blueprints for human 
security objectives.
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The first strategy is the most difficult of the four. David Shambaugh has correctly observed 
that what is emerging in the Asian region—‘stretching from Afghanistan in the southwest 
to Russia in the north to Japan in the northeast to Australia in the southeast’—is a 
‘multitextured and multilayered hybrid system’ of: (1) residual US-led bilateralism; (2) a latent, 
multipolar balance-of-power system that is spearheaded by an intensifying Sino–American 
rivalry; and (3) the early trappings of a security community constituting ‘… a dense web of 
economic, technological and other ties’ (Shambaugh 2005: 15–17). The Rudd government 
will need to strike a balance between regional engagement and alliance affinity on such key 
issues as Taiwan, regional arms control, maritime and energy security, human rights and 
international terrorism. Australia must be skilled enough to use existing instrumentalities in 
ways that unite and reassure its neighbours rather than divide and alienate them.
Policy options for implementing this strategic posture abound but all of their ramifications 
must be carefully weighed. On Taiwan, for example, Australia could be more explicit than 
its American ally who still clings to the posture of ‘strategic ambiguity’. Unprovoked Chinese 
aggression against that island would qualify as a contingency for Australia to support an 
American defence of Taipei with limited military assistance. Any other scenario, however, 
would not be regarded as sufficient grounds to justify Australian military involvement. 
Sustained Australian consultations with its American ally on Taiwan modelled on those 
conducted by the Rudd government with the Bush Administration over the withdrawal of 
combat troops from Iraq could be employed to ensure intra-alliance transparency in the 
event a future Taiwan crisis intensified to critical levels.
On maritime security, Australia and the US could mutually 
explore more effective ways to interact with ASEAN states …
On maritime security, Australia and the US could mutually explore more effective ways to 
interact with ASEAN states, applying greater policy sensitivity to such issues as sovereignty 
and naval patrolling. Otherwise, ASEAN’s recent rejection of the US Pacific Command’s 
(PACOM’s) March 2004 Regional Maritime Security Initiative and Southeast Asian 
resentment over Australia’s unilateral declaration of a 1,000-nautical-mile maritime security 
zone in December 2004, are bound to be repeated. PACOM and the Australian defence 
establishment could work together to be better attuned to the broader Asian community, 
consulting with regional actors more frequently and more systematically. This would involve 
changing long-standing hierarchical styles of decision-making often reflected in traditional 
hub-and-spokes bilateralism to more consensus-oriented styles found within the ARF and 
other multilateral architectures. Greater sea-lane security, for example, could probably be 
achieved by winning greater regional support for such measures via upgraded consultation, 
negotiation and compromise with intended ASEAN and South Pacific beneficiaries.
Similar initiatives could be applied to discussion of nuclear arms control in the Asia–Pacific 
within the ARF or the TSD to encourage US–China bilateral negotiations on this issue. 
Arms control negotiations have no real substantive legacy in the region despite existing 
declaratory opposition to nuclear weapons by the TAC and the Southeast Asian Nuclear 
Free Zone (SEANFZ). Australia must take care, however, not to lock itself into rigid and 
uncompromising positions. The Rudd government’s decision in January 2008 to reverse 
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its predecessor’s willingness to consider selling Australian uranium to India on the basis of 
propping up a fragile Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is illustrative. It may 
well be the case, after considered deliberations and negotiations, that the NPT regime’s 
preservation outweighs the commercial and strategic advantages of selling uranium to India. 
However, the timing and context of the announcement to reverse policy in this case seemed 
predicated more on fulfilling an election campaign promise than on the basis of a genuinely 
thorough review of Australian–Indian relations. If such was the case, neither the NPT nor the 
Australian–Indian bilateral relationship was particularly well served.
Second, unease over the cumbersome labyrinth of regional security architectures in the 
Asia–Pacific remains pronounced within many regional capitals. At times it seems that each 
major security issue generates compelling reasons for creating a new multilateral instrument 
in its wake. The Six-Party Talks exemplifies this tendency with speculation about the creation 
of a Northeast Asian Security Dialogue. This is an important development for Australia 
which depends on Northeast Asia for sustaining a substantial portion of its overall trade 
volume. But the precise basis for how this Dialogue would operate relative to other Asian 
security architectures remains unclear. And the risks are substantial that such a grouping 
would exacerbate already significant Southeast Asian apprehensions about great power 
politics in Northeast Asia overwhelming their own influence on regional affairs. Even existing 
architectures sometimes behave more as rivals for policy turf than as organisations able to 
complement each other’s agendas. Latent nationalism, competing cultures and unresolved 
historical grievances all combine to make Asia very different from postwar Europe.
Australia must therefore intensify its involvement with 
its regional counterparts in planning how to streamline 
the cooperative security infrastructure in Asia to make it 
work better.
Providing tangible leadership for security community-building is clearly a difficult task. 
This does not, however, alleviate the need for Australia and other regional actors to explore 
ways to better organise and apply multilateral frameworks to the resolution of Asia–Pacific 
security problems. Australia must therefore intensify its involvement with its regional 
counterparts in planning how to streamline the cooperative security infrastructure in Asia to 
make it work better. Some hard questions need to be confronted honestly and some major 
decisions about the region’s multilateral security framework need to be made soon. Has the 
ARF become so top-heavy that it now has little chance to truly embrace preventive diplomacy 
or to realise its vision of comprehensive security? If ARF’s current lethargy means that 
ASEAN’s vision of community-building is obsolete, how should the region’s existing security 
framework be utilised—without creating yet another new cooperative security organisation? 
Could the APEC Leaders Meeting, for example, be transformed into a separate security body 
where only the heads of government of key Asia–Pacific powers (China, Japan, India, the 
US, and Russia) meet annually with the South Korean and North Korean presidents, their 
Pakistani correspondent, a single ASEAN representative and a single representative from the 
Pacific Island states to negotiate regional security in a ‘concert-plus’ setting (Gyngell 2007)? 
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The hierarchical version of order-building that this approach would inevitably entail may, 
however, actually be more destabilising than allowing current architectures to ‘muddle 
through’ until better solutions are found. A key assignment for this Australian government is 
to weigh systematically and unsentimentally which approach to regional order-building best 
suits Australia’s own national interests, and how to implement that approach.
There is a third and no less daunting task: carefully but steadfastly advising the US on 
how its affection for the politics of competitive geometries must ultimately morph to a 
hybrid of alliance and multilateral institution-based cooperative security. The ideological 
underpinnings driving the Quadrilateral Initiative proved to be unpalatable not only to those 
such as China who believed it was targeted against their interests but, to various degrees, 
its designated participants. Convincing a new American Administration that takes office in 
January 2009 that it must seriously re-examine its Asia–Pacific security infrastructure at 
a time when Iraq, international terrorism and WMD proliferation will dominate its agenda 
is a challenge. For Washington not to do so, however, only postpones the time when it will 
face the hard inevitability that it must share power in the Asia–Pacific in ways not previously 
required. A first step to initiating this process in the context of bilateral alliance deliberations 
may be for the Rudd government and its impending US counterpart to jointly commission a 
Track II mechanism, such as the Australian–American Dialogue, to address this issue.
… Australia needs to ensure that existing and future 
multilateral security structures provide it with the 
opportunities to practice a range of ‘good citizenship’ tasks.
Finally, Australia needs to ensure that existing and future multilateral security structures 
provide it with the opportunities to practice a range of ‘good citizenship’ tasks. Australia’s 
image and influence is enhanced when it is viewed by its neighbours and by other developing 
states as practising good international citizenship. In 2005, Australian participation in the 
post-tsunami rescue and rebuilding efforts, significantly assisted in overcoming Indonesian 
hostility to Australia. Similarly, Australia’s recent ratification of the Kyoto accord on climate 
change drew plaudits from other delegates who attended the global warming conference 
held in Bali at the end of 2007. Substance must accompany policy style, and meticulous 
calculations of Australia’s best policy interest must precede any public expressions. Carefully 
orchestrated human security politics, however, can offer important diplomatic gains for a 
middle power.
The timing may be right for Australian policy makers to host a forum where it can exchange 
views and ideas with designated and proven human security actors drawn from the ranks 
of other states and from selected NGOs on how best to advance this form of multilateral 
security politics in the years ahead. It can employ its agenda of ‘alternative security’ activities 
already pursued within regional institutions and international regimes as a foundation for 
forum discussion and debate, and might even consider creating a special human security 
office within the independent National Security Office that the Rudd government is 
now forming.
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Those four initial steps might help build a stronger foundation for Rudd’s vision of an 
overarching regional community. But we should not underestimate the enormity of that 
larger challenge. History and geography have placed Australia’s Western heritage at the 
edge of the world’s most complex montage of differing cultures and races—the Asia–Pacific 
region. Constrained by cultural differences, hampered by residual memories of Western 
colonialism, traditionally protected by Anglo–American allies in an increasingly complicated 
and dangerous world, Australia’s foreign policy has been necessarily sophisticated and 
commendably effective. Our policy makers and diplomats have largely mastered the nuances 
of Asia–Pacific politics and adroitly managed the limited resources available to a middle 
power in Australia’s relationships with its greater power protectors and trading partners.
Now, however, Australia is facing a crossroads on how it will restructure and effectively 
implement its dual strategy to meet the rapidly changing conditions and imperatives that are 
determining the future of Asia–Pacific security. A critical challenge for the new government’s 
foreign policy will be how to work successfully with its regional partners to utilise, simplify 
and improve the organisation of the Asia–Pacific’s security framework while simultaneously 
assisting the US to become more involved with that framework. The future relevance of its 
dual strategy and the long-term viability of its national security may well depend on how 
well this challenge is met.
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Table 1: Asia–Pacific cooperative security institutions
ASEAN Regional Forum (1994)
Brunei (Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN Member)
Burma [Myanmar] (ASEAN Member)
Cambodia (ASEAN Member)
Indonesia (ASEAN Member)
Laos (ASEAN Member)
Malaysia (ASEAN Member)
Philippines (ASEAN Member)
Singapore (ASEAN Member)
Thailand (ASEAN member)
Vietnam (ASEAN Member)
Papua New Guinea (ASEAN Observer but an ARF Member)
Australia (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
Canada (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
The European Union (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
India (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
Japan (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
New Zealand (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
People’s Republic of China (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
Republic of Korea (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
Russia (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
United States (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Mongolia
Pakistan
Timor-Leste
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Note: In August 2007, the 14th ASEAN Regional Forum stipulated 
that ‘applications to participate in the ARF would be considered on a 
case-by-case basis in accordance with the established criteria. In this 
connection, they agreed on the need to consolidate ARF activities for 
the time being and to consider applications at a later period’
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Table 1: Asia–Pacific cooperative security institutions (continued)
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Member Economies (1989)
Australia
Brunei Darussalam
Canada
Chile
People’s Republic of China
Hong Kong, China
Indonesia
Japan
Republic of Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Russia
Singapore
Chinese Taipei
Thailand
United States
Viet Nam
Note: No additional members will be allowed until 2010.
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Table 1: Asia–Pacific cooperative security institutions (continued)
East Asia Summit (2005)
Brunei (Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN Member)
Burma [Myanmar] (ASEAN Member)
Cambodia (ASEAN Member)
Indonesia (ASEAN Member)
Laos (ASEAN Member)
Malaysia (ASEAN Member)
Philippines (ASEAN Member)
Singapore (ASEAN Member)
Thailand (ASEAN member)
Vietnam (ASEAN Member)
Japan (ASEAN + 3 Member)
People’s Republic of China (ASEAN + 3 Member)
Republic of Korea (ASEAN + 3 Member)
Australia (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
India (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
New Zealand (ASEAN Dialogue Partner)
Note: Three criteria for membership exist: (1) the country must already be a dialogue 
partner of ASEAN; (2) it must subscribe to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation or TAC; 
and (3) it must have substantive relations with the grouping. Russia desires entry but has 
not been deemed as yet meeting the third condition. The European Union has requested 
observer status but there is no such category of membership. Based on ASEAN countries’ 
current fears that broadening the EAS membership substantially would dilute its ‘East Asian 
identity’, membership was frozen in May 2006 for two years.
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Table 2: Asia–Pacific competitive geometries
San Francisco System (US Bilateral Alliances)
ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–US, 1952)1
US–Republic of Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1954)
US–Republic of the Philippines (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1952)2
South East Asia Collective Defense (US–France–Australia–New Zealand–Thailand–
Philippines, 1955)3
US–Japan (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1951/revised in 1960)
US–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty (1955)4
US–Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement (2005)5
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
Australia–Japan and the United States
• A ‘Trilateral Security Dialogue’ commenced between these three states in August 2002 at 
the vice-ministerial level.
• In March 2006, the ‘Trilateral Security Dialogue’ became the ‘Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’ 
when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice travelled to Sydney to meet with Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso.
• TSD deliberations are now usually conducted at the vice-ministerial level on a broad range 
of global issues, including developments in the Asia–Pacific region and the Middle East, 
counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To date, the TSD does 
not normally include defence officials from the three countries. In June 2007, however, 
the three countries’ defence ministers met on the ‘sidelines’ of the Shangri-La Dialogue 
in Singapore to discuss TSD-related issues. The three countries’ heads-of-state met in a 
similar context at the September 2007 APEC meeting in Sydney.
• TSD currently has no secretariat or other central coordinating institutional mechanism. 
Joint military exercises are under discussion but thus far Japanese and Australian military 
units have drilled collectively with their US counterparts only as part of larger multilateral 
configurations: i.e. the biennial RIMPAC exercises or the recent Malabar 2007 manoeuvres 
with India and Singapore.
1 The United States suspended its defence obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS accord in 
February 1985 and does not interact with New Zealand in a formal alliance context. Australia and 
New Zealand do continue defence cooperation under ANZUS but Australia observes US restrictions on 
the transfer of American defence intelligence, technology and other assets to New Zealand. 
2 US basing operations and the withdrawal of permanently stationed US military forces occurred in 1991 
after the Philippines Senate failed to ratify extensions to US basing agreements.
3 The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation was discontinued in June 1977 but the United States still 
recognises the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or ‘Manila Pact’ as a formally binding 
US defense commitment to Thailand. This bilateral commitment was reiterated in March 1962 
Rusk-Thanat Communique. 
4 This treaty was terminated by the United States in January 1980 one year after it normalised relations 
with the People’s Republic of China. The Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the United States Congress 
to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means as a matter of 
‘grave concern’ to the United States but does not explicitly commit the US to defend Taiwan.
5 Building on an earlier Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1990 that authorised intermittent 
US defence forces’ access to Singapore’s ports and airfields, the Strategic Framework Agreement focused 
on counter-terrorism and joint force interoperability. The US and Singapore, however, have not entered 
into a formal bilateral security treaty.
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Table 2: Asia–Pacific competitive geometries (continued)
Quadrilateral Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan and the United States)
• There is presently no formal alliance or coalition grouping of these four countries 
although informal discussions between them on various aspects of defence cooperation 
occurred during 2007.
• The concept stemmed from effective disaster relief cooperation between the four 
countries following the Indian Ocean tsunami and the interest in pursuing closer 
avenues of quadrilateral cooperation by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 
US Vice President Dick Cheney.
• China has opposed any such grouping as a containment-oriented potential ‘axis of 
democracies’ directed against itself.
• Both the Indian and Australian prime ministers have recently denied any plans for their 
countries to enter into a quadrilateral defence alliance.
• US presidential candidate John McCain supports the concept.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): A Pacific Dimension?
• Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and New Zealand are formally designated 
‘Contact Countries’ that ‘share similar strategic concerns and key Alliance values’.
• Japan has conducted a biannual strategic dialogue with NATO officials since 1990.
• Australian troops are deployed in Afghanistan under NATO command.
• The US Ambassador to NATO designated Australia, Japan and other contact countries 
as part of an ‘expanded political global alliance’ in a January 2006 press interview that 
would operate ‘well beyond transatlantic geography’. That vision has been resisted 
by NATO European members who are apprehensive about NATO becoming a ‘global 
policeman’. The April 2008 NATO Summit’s Bucharest Declaration, however, welcomed 
‘the significant contribution by Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore to NATO-led 
efforts in Afghanistan … [and] … the valuable contributions by the Republic of Korea to 
efforts which support the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.’ The Declaration noted that 
‘… recognising that each of these countries wishes to pursue a unique degree of relations 
with NATO, and that other countries may wish to pursue dialogue and cooperation with 
NATO as well, we (the NATO member-states) reiterate our willingness to further develop 
existing, and openness to new, individual relationships, subject to the approval of the 
North Atlantic Council, and at a pace that respects mutual interests in so doing’.
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Table 2: Asia–Pacific competitive geometries (continued)
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
• Evolved from the ‘Shanghai Five’ that initially convened in 1996 and formally created in 
June 2001.
• The People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
are formal members.
• India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia are observer states.
• It has formal linkages with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that 
evolved out of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) network of ‘Soviet 
successor states’ following the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991.
• The SCO is formally represented as an organisation designed to counter terrorism, 
separatism and extremism in Central Asia. Various Western analysts believe it is 
actually intended to counterbalance NATO expansion and NATO’s military presence 
in Afghanistan.
• It conducts a major biennial military exercise (Peace Mission) in which some of the latest 
Russian and Chinese weapons systems are trialled. Russia has advocated future Indian 
participation in these exercises as a means of balancing the recent upgrading of Indian 
military ties with the United States.
• Expansion of formal SCO membership is currently frozen until ongoing studies within the 
organisation’s secretariat about future missions and directions are completed.
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AMM ARF Ministerial Meeting
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China–Japan–
South Korea
ASPAC Asian–Pacific Council
CSCAP Council on Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
EAS East Asia Summit
IMF International Monetary Fund
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
PACOM US Pacific Command
PRC People’s Republic of China
RMSI US Pacific Command’s Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDF Japan’s Self-Defence Force
SEANFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SPT Six-Party Talks
TAC ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TSD Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
Acronyms
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Policy Analysis: Generally written by ASPI experts, POLICY ANALYSIS is provided online to 
give readers timely, insightful opinion pieces on current strategic issues, with clear policy 
recommendations when appropriate.
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Australian Government, state governments, foreign governments and industry.
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Security architectures in Asia
Asia is undergoing a deep and dynamic transformation. One effect of that transformation 
is to place new pressures on the regional security order, which must adjust to a set of 
shifting strategic relativities and relationships. Nowhere are those pressures more likely to 
be felt than in the shape of the region’s security architectures: those structures that bound 
security cooperation and competition amongst the regional players. Around the region, 
security thinkers have begun to reexamine the principal multilateral structures which exist 
and to anticipate new structures which might emerge. With Australia’s recent change of 
government, we too are re-examining a key but delicate piece of Australian strategic policy: 
how to calibrate our alliance with the United States with our engagement in the emerging 
security architectures in the Asia–Pacific.
In this paper, William Tow surveys Australia’s long-standing ‘dual strategy’ of alliance affinity 
and regional engagement. He argues that Australia should continue to pursue that strategy. 
But in the rapidly-changing Asian security environment, Australia needs to achieve a better 
policy balance between the two approaches. Part of the solution is to minimize the ‘gap’ 
inherent in the strategy, by inducing the US to adopt a more accommodating approach 
towards the region’s multilateral security structures. The impending election of a new 
American presidential administration makes such an approach timely. But we also need 
to put more work into shaping the regional structures, to enhance the prospects for great 
power cooperation, confidence-building and conflict avoidance.
The study offers specific proposals for implementing that strategy. It envisions Australia 
working with its ASEAN neighbours and other Asian states to implement a middle-power 
‘grand strategy’ designed to secure stronger levels of great power support for better 
integration of the existing architectures. Any such strategy will need to reduce ‘mission 
overlap’ between existing cooperative security institutions in the Asia–Pacific and gradually 
embrace a significant human security agenda. The Rudd government’s challenge will be to 
pursue its vision of an Asia–Pacific community in tandem with the equally difficult task of 
persuading US policy makers to accept cooperative security institutions as more conducive 
to their national interests than is now the case.
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